









 Cite as http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=12&article=2  This work is made available under the  Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License  
THE USE AND ABUSE OF PATENT REEXAMINATION: SHAM PETITIONING BEFORE THE 
USPTO  
Raymond A. Mercado1
This article investigates the susceptibility of the patent 
reexamination process to abuse and argues that “sham petitioning” in the 
reexamination context threatens to undermine the quid pro quo of the 
patent system, jeopardizing the objectives of innovation and disclosure by 
weakening the incentive of the patent right. Since reexamination casts a 
cloud on the validity of a patent and harms enforceability, the patent 
holder subject to such a proceeding instigated under false pretenses can be 
deprived of the economic benefits his patent should otherwise have 
afforded him.  In an effort to help craft a solution, the article explores the 
ways in which reexamination is vulnerable to abuse and looks closely at 
several instances of alleged misconduct. It contends that state tort 
remedies provide patent holders subject to unwarranted proceedings an 
adequate recourse for harms suffered.  It also comments on a recent case 
in which the Federal Circuit was asked to consider whether such remedies 
are preempted, arguing that the court's surprising decision to affirm 
without opinion perpetuates uncertainty throughout the patent system and 
evades important questions of first impression. Finally, a number of 
proposals are offered with a view to curbing abuse in current and future 
variants of the reexamination process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Patents are government-granted property rights2 bestowing upon inventors limited 
terms3 of exclusivity4 over their inventions in order to reward5 them for revealing their 
discoveries to the public and hence opting to forego the advantages of trade secret 
protection.6  The patent right, as distinguished from the traditional monopoly,7
                                                     
2  See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 261 (2010) (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of 
personal property.”); see also Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff (“Patlex I”), 758 F.2d 594, 599-600 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[P]atent property rights, necessarily including the right ‘to license and exploit 
patents’, fall squarely within both classical and judicial definitions of protectable property . . . 
[and] the right to exclude . . . is implemented by the licensing and exploitation of patents.”), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part on reh’g (“Patlex II”), 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Consolidated 
Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) (“Inventors are a meritorious class.  They are 
public benefactors.  They add to the wealth and comfort of the community and promote the 
progress of civilization.  A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land.  The 
right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”). 
 is granted 
3  See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (setting the patent term as 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent was filed).   
4  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Carl Schenk, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 
782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very 
definition of ‘property.’”); Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 
637, 643 (1947) (stating that the patent right “carries for the statutory period ‘a right to be free 
from competition in the practice of the invention’ . . . [and] [t]hat exclusive right, being the 
essence of the patent privilege, is . . . of the same dignity as any other property which may be 
used to purchase patents”). 
5  See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (“As a 
reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a . . . monopoly 
to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret.”). 
6  See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933) (“An 
inventor . . . may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely.  In consideration of its 
disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted.  An exclusive 
enjoyment is guaranteed him . . . but upon expiration of that period, the knowledge of the 
invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit 
by its use.”). 
7  See In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400, at *51 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 
13, 2009) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc) (“The United States Supreme 
Court has long recognized the distinction between the odious monopolies that were the target of 
the English Statute of Monopolies, and patents for invention, which serve the public interest.”). 




in exchange for the disclosure8 of new technical knowledge to the public.9  Accordingly, 
the law requires that an invention for which a patent is sought be, inter alia, both novel 
and nonobvious.10  If a patent applicant were to mislead the U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office (“PTO”) into issuing him a patent—for example, by withholding or 
misrepresenting evidence which would have shown that his purported “invention” was in 
fact not new but had been known to others—it is clear that, by deceiving the PTO into 
awarding him exclusive rights over a product or process while having himself contributed 
nothing to the advancement of technology, he would have perpetrated a very great harm 
on the public, and enriched himself thereby.11  To do so would be to lay “the heavy hand 
of tribute” on what is already in the public domain.12
 In view of such considerations, it has long been appreciated that the “public 
interest demands that all facts relevant to” any “possible fraud or inequitableness 
underlying” a pending patent application be “submitted formally or informally to the 
Patent Office.”
   
13  Inventors and their attorneys are required to exercise “the highest 
degree of candor and good faith”14
                                                     
8  See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (explaining 
the value of disclosure).  
 in their conduct before the PTO, for “only in this 
way” can the public be protected in the first instance from “fraudulent patent 
9  See Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 186 (“Though often so characterized, a patent is not, accurately 
speaking, a monopoly, for it is not created by the executive authority at the expense and to the 
prejudice of all the community except the grantee of the patent.  The term monopoly connotes the 
giving of an exclusive privilege for buying, selling, working or using a thing which the public 
freely enjoyed prior to the grant.  Thus a monopoly takes something from the people.  An 
inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives 
something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.”). 
10  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2010).  Of course, other criteria for patentability must be met, 
among them the threshold requirement that the invention or discovery be eligible for patent 
protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010). 
11  See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) 
(“[S]ections 102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent protection 
knowledge that is already available to the public . . . [and] express a congressional determination 
that the creation of a monopoly in such information would not only serve no socially useful 
purpose, but would in fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge.”). 
12  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964);  see also Aronson v. 
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“[T]he stringent requirements for patent 
protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the 
public.”). 
13  Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945). 
14  Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319 (1949). 




monopolies”15 and their repercussions.  When a court finds a patent to have been 
obtained through inequitable conduct16 before the PTO, the patent in question is rendered 
unenforceable,17
 Suppose, however, that we render the preceding scenario in reverse: imagine that 
a company, wishing to damage a rival’s business or simply to use a patented technology 
without paying royalties, were to fabricate or grossly misrepresent evidence purporting to 
show that its rival’s patented invention is neither novel, nor nonobvious.  The company 
petitions the PTO to reconsider its patentability, and the PTO, deceived by the company’s 
misrepresentations, agrees to review the propriety of the patent grant.  In consequence, 
the owner’s property interests in the patent are suddenly thrown into question by the mere 
fact of the PTO’s reconsideration of its validity, though initiated on the basis of a “sham 
petition.”
 relieving not only the accused infringer but the public, too, from the 
burdens imposed by the wrongful monopoly. 
18
                                                     
15  Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 818. 
   
16  The doctrine of “inequitable conduct” provides a defense to those accused of patent 
infringement whereby they may escape liability through a showing that the patent was wrongfully 
obtained via misconduct before the PTO; under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, an allegation of inequitable 
conduct can also form the basis of a declaratory judgment claim for unenforceability of a patent.  
Frequently invoked and less frequently proven, inequitable conduct has been subject to the oft-
repeated criticism that overpleading has created unwanted “side effects” that outweigh the 
doctrine’s aim of deterring misconduct before the PTO.  While it should be noted that 
“inequitable conduct is a broader, more inclusive concept than . . . common law fraud,” 
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the present 
author is neither convinced that a radical limitation of the doctrine would be free of its own 
undesirable consequences (e.g., an increase in misconduct), nor persuaded that its underlying 
objectives are outweighed by any side effects it creates.  For representative discussions, see 
Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 Harv. J. 
L. & Tech. 37 (1993-1994) and Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct 
Defense, 13 Va. J.L. & Tech. 7 (2008).  It must be noted that, at the time of writing, the Federal 
Circuit was considering whether to modify the standard for inequitable conduct in an important 
pending case, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, 
-1595, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9549 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2010) (order granting reh’g en banc). 
17  See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-62 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
18  “Sham petitioning” refers to the misuse of administrative proceedings for anti-
competitive purposes, e.g., in order to delay market entry from emerging competitors.  See 
generally Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74 
N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1995-1996).  As used here, the term “sham” originates in an exception to the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which provides broad immunity (most often in the antitrust context) 
to those availing themselves of their right to petition the government, unless their petitioning 
activity can be shown to be a “mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt 
to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”  Eastern R.R. Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).  Thus, those who petition agencies such as 
the PTO enjoy Noerr-Pennington immunity, “at least unless it is shown that the entire federal 
 




 Unfortunately, as I will show, this scenario is far from speculative.  The law 
permits competitors, indeed anyone, to request that the PTO commence a form of 
administrative review, known as a patent reexamination proceeding,19 in order to 
reexamine the validity of an issued patent.  These proceedings, like the patent application 
process, carry with them the potential for inequitable conduct,20 though here the 
misconduct is perpetrated not against the public with the aim of obtaining a wrongful 
monopoly, but against the inventor with the aim of depriving him of his patent.21  As with 
patent application procedures, which require applicants to submit evidence in support of 
patentability, the reexamination process requires parties to submit evidence in support of 
any request that the PTO reexamine a patent.  Yet when the evidence is spurious and the 
petition for reexamination a sham, the inventor must bear the burden of having to prove it 
false if he is to be successful in defending his patent—to say nothing of the possibility 
that the fraudulent or misleading character of such evidence might never be discovered.22  
Meanwhile he must endure grave doubts in the marketplace regarding his very 
entitlement to the patent.23
                                                                                                                                                              
agency action [instigated by the petitioner] was a ‘sham.’”  Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 
1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
  Thus, just as unscrupulous applicants can harm the public by 
obtaining a patent through fraud on the PTO, so an inventor’s competitors can deprive 
him of the economic benefits his patent rights would otherwise have afforded him by 
subjecting his patent to baseless reexamination proceedings before the PTO, casting 
19  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2010) for ex parte patent reexamination procedures and 35 
U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2010) for inter partes reexamination.  Unless otherwise noted in the text, I 
refer to ex parte reexamination, which is by far the most common form of the proceeding. 
20  See Anthony H. Handal, Re-Examination: Some Tactical Considerations—A Private 
Practitioner’s Viewpoint, 9 AIPLA Q.J. 249, 251 (1981) (“Like other forms of action under the 
patent law, the new reexamination procedure is susceptible to substantial misuses.”); see also 
Interview by the Reexamination Center with IP lawyer Taraneh Maghamé (Oct. 12, 2009) (noting 
opportunities for requesters to abuse the reexamination system and explaining that “[s]uch abuse 
takes the form of serial reexaminations of the same patent . . . or the filing of non-meritorious 
requests for reexamination”), available at http://www.maghame-
legal.com/uploads/The_Reexamination_Center_Executive_Interview_-_Taraneh_Maghame.pdf. 
21  Of course the public may suffer indirectly, e.g., when startup companies find capital more 
difficult to secure in the absence of patent protection.  See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
22  See Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ Prods, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1355, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 
1995) (“[W]hen a reexamination requester other than the patent owner fails to exercise candor 
and good faith during a reexamination proceeding, the fact might never be discovered.  If, by 
withholding material information, the requestor is successful in having the claims of its 
opponent’s patent canceled, any pending litigation would be dismissed.  The patent owner would 
not have an opportunity to discover the withheld information in subsequent litigation.”). 
23  See Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that reexamination 
carries a “stigma or uncertainty regarding entitlement to the patent”). 




doubt as to its validity where there should have been none.  As this article will show, 
patent reexamination proceedings are as vulnerable as many other administrative 
procedures to the well-known practice of sham petitioning, with particularly damaging 
repercussions for patent holders.24
 After all, if the PTO can be deceived into granting a patent, it is no leap of faith to 
admit that the Office can be deceived into reexamining and even rejecting a valid one.  
Though some have argued that “if the PTO decides to grant the request, the request was 
ipso facto not objectively baseless,”
 
25 the law of malicious prosecution recognizes the 
fallacy of equating court and agency decisions as conclusive evidence of probable cause: 
courts and agencies can be deceived.  If a requester were to induce the PTO to initiate a 
reexamination proceeding by submitting “materially false facts,”26 the law of malicious 
prosecution would find “the presumption of probable cause [to be] effectually 
rebutted.”27  Skepticism regarding this possibility rests largely on confidence in the 
current safeguard against requests brought for the purpose of harassment (the “substantial 
new question of patentability” standard) to function as it was intended.  Yet, 
distressingly, this threshold standard was recently referred to by the former Chief Judge 
of the Federal Circuit as “almost no standard at all.”28  As will be argued in this article, 
the standard has neither been rigorously interpreted, nor carefully applied, and failure to 
do so has left reexamination susceptible to abuse.29
                                                     
24  See infra Section III.A. 
  Consequently, the process is being 
25  Brief of O’Melveny & Myers LLP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees 
at 16, Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 2010-1189 (Fed. Cir., 
docketed Feb. 17, 2010). 
26  Roberts v. Sentry Life Ins., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408, 414 (Ct. App. 1999)  (“[T]here may be 
situations where denial of summary judgment should not irrefutably establish probable cause.  
For example, if denial of summary judgment was induced by materially false facts submitted in 
opposition, equating denial with probable cause might be wrong.  Summary judgment might have 
been granted but for the false evidence.  (For that matter, a jury verdict also might be induced by 
materially false testimony, raising a good argument that no conclusive presumption of probable 
cause should arise.)”). 
27  Plumley v. Mockett, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 822, 839 (Ct. App. 2008) (presumption of probable 
cause rebutted when court’s decision is “procured by fraud, perjury or subornation of perjury, or 
other unfair conduct on the part of the defendant” (citing Carpenter v. Sibley, 153 Cal. 215, 218 
(1908)). 
28  Former Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, Lecture at the Fordham University School of Law 
Intellectual Property Law Institute: Innovation, Incentives, Competition, and Patent Law Reform: 
Should Congress Fix the Patent Office and Leave Litigation Management to the Courts? (Nov. 
18, 2009). 
29  See infra Section III.A for discussion; see also Christopher L. Logan, Patent Reform 
2005: HR 2795 and the Road to Post-Grant Oppositions, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 975, 995 (2005-
 




used in a manner at the outer limits of legality and Congressional intent, and in some 
cases instigated under false pretenses. 
 The inventor who finds himself subject to unwarranted reexamination 
proceedings faces an almost impossible situation: the validity of his property rights 
having been thrown into question, he is simultaneously deprived of his ability to profit 
from the patent and forced to expend significant time and resources to dispel the cloud 
cast over it.30  Users of the patented technology have no motive to purchase a license for 
it when the patent is undergoing renewed scrutiny, and courts are far less willing to 
entertain litigation brought to enforce patent rights which have been called into question 
by the PTO.31  For companies employing technology still in its infancy, reexamination 
can be “the first step in halting development of that technology . . . neutralizing the 
economic ability of the new firm to develop the technology by so overburdening it with 
serious patent problems as to substantially weaken that firm and its ability to continue 
attracting investment.”32
 An unwarranted reexamination proceeding has an effect on patent rights 
analogous to that of an improper lis pendens filing on real estate: “it puts a cloud on 
title,”
 
33 vastly complicating the attempt to enforce the patent right of exclusion, and 
effectively precluding the sale or licensing of the patent—at least for anything more than 
a fraction of its true value—until the reexamination is resolved.34
                                                                                                                                                              
2006) (arguing that the SNQ “provision with regards to reexamination has proven ineffective in 
the past”). 
  As the Supreme Court 
has held, “a patent which does not carry with it the limited monopoly referred to in the 
30  See Amy L. Magas, Comment, When Politics Interfere with Patent Reexamination, 4 J. 
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 160, 182 (2004) (observing that if a “patentee is forced into 
reexamination, the result is a costly process which can take several years to complete and can 
result in delays in licensing opportunities”). 
31  See infra Section II.A. 
32  See Handal, supra note 19, at 251. 
33  Jeffrey Huron, Lis Pendulum: The Risks of Recording an Improper Lis Pendens Are Now 
Greater Than Ever, Obliging Counsel to Ensure They Have a Viable Claim, 30 L.A. Lawyer 27 
(2008) (“[T]he practical effect of filing a lis pendens is to make the affected property 
unmarketable as long as the lis pendens remains of record.” (quoting Amalgamated Bank v. 
Super. Ct., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686 (Ct. App. 2007))). 
34  Lawrence Pope has suggested to me that this cloud might be ameliorated somewhat 
through a creative use of “contingent licensing” arrangements, whereby a party might agree to 
purchase a license to a patent for a reduced fee in consideration of the uncertainty occasioned by 
the reexamination.  This is an interesting suggestion, although it still seems undeniable that the 
backdrop of an ongoing reexamination has a deleterious effect on the patent’s value.  In a 
scenario where a party agrees to buy a license on the condition that the patent survives 
reexamination unscathed, there is obviously the risk that such a “deferred licensee” might go out 
of business by the time the patent reemerges. 




Constitution is in reality not a patent at all.”35  This is particularly true during the 
pendency of a reexamination.36  And as one member of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
recently explained, merely to mount a defense of one’s patent in a reexamination 
proceeding “routinely costs a patent owner hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees” 
and “many smaller companies, universities, and others, when faced with these costs will 
simply abandon their patent because they lack money to defend themselves.  In many 
cases simply granting these proceedings is a death sentence for a patent.”37
 When innovators elect to disclose what they might more easily have kept secret,
 
38 
and when they have endured the lengthy and expensive process39 of obtaining patents for 
the inventions they have labored to perfect—they, no less than the public, must be 
protected from the consequences of fraud on the PTO.  They must be able to expect that 
their property rights will not be nullified40 or otherwise diluted through fraud41
                                                     
35  See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 202 (1933). 
 
36  See infra Section II.A for further elaboration and Section II.B for consideration of 
possible objections. 
37  Senator Jon Kyl, Remarks at Executive Business Meeting of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee (Mar. 31, 2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/webcast/judiciary03312009-
1000.ram; see also Logan, supra note 28, at 994 (“[T]he patentee is at a distinct disadvantage 
where the only alternatives are to pay the costs associated with an opposition proceeding or forgo 
his rights under the patent.  The repugnance of such a quandary needs no explanation.”); Handal, 
supra note 19, at 252 (“[I]t is possible that a number of patents might be lost solely due to the 
inability of the patent holder to financially deal with the problem.”). 
38  Cf. Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 228 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting plaintiff’s 
protest that, had it known that it would later be subjected to the vagaries of reexamination, “it 
could have refused the patent grant [in the first place], thereby maintaining the secrecy of its 
invention”).  Although in Joy the plaintiff’s patent had issued prior to the passage of the 
reexamination statutes into law, the general point stands: if the patent grant can be nullified 
through abuse of the reexamination process, many inventors may begin to feel themselves better 
off by opting for trade secrecy. 
39  According to the most recent statistics, applicants can expect to wait an average of 25.8 
months before the PTO issues a first office action, and an average of 34.6 months before their 
patents issue.  See USPTO Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2009, at 115 
tbl.4, available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf. 
40  See Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 
1980) (“The . . . [term of patent] exclusion is a right and not a matter of grace or favor . . . It is a 
property right . . . of which the patentee cannot be deprived without due process of law.”). 
41  Cf. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1859) (“[W]hilst inventors are bound to 
diligence and fairness in their dealings with the public, with reference to their discoveries on the 
other hand, they are by obligations equally strong entitled to protections against frauds or wrongs 
 




perpetrated in PTO proceedings by others.42
 Land owners, when false statements are published disparaging their property 
rights, ordinarily have recourse to a number of remedies, such as actions for slander of 
title, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.  Whether patent owners may seek the 
same remedies for damages suffered as a result of false aspersions cast on their property 
by baseless reexamination proceedings is a question which was presented by a recent 
case before the Federal Circuit.  In Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton,
  If and when fraud does occur, patent holders 
must have recourse to some remedy. 
43 
the patent holder, Lockwood, alleged that the defendants filed fraudulent and misleading 
requests for reexamination of two of his patents.44
                                                                                                                                                              
practiced to pirate from them the results of thought and labor, in which nearly a lifetime may have 
been exhausted . . . which fruits the public are ultimately to gather.”) 
  The reexaminations ultimately 
concluded in Lockwood’s favor, confirming the validity of his patents, at which point he 
42  See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945) 
(“[P]arties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to report to it all facts 
concerning possible fraud or inequitableness”).  37 C.F.R. § 11.18 (2010), which prohibits 
“knowingly and willfully mak[ing] any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or 
representations” to the PTO, applies to any “party presenting such paper [to the PTO], whether a 
practitioner or non-practitioner,” and thus would govern anyone requesting reexamination.  See 
Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“37 C.F.R. § 11.18 governs 
representations to the PTO by practitioners and non-practitioners.”).  The Tenth Circuit has 
specifically held that the duty of candor to the PTO extends to those challenging the validity of 
issued patents, as well as to patent holders and applicants.  See Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 967 
F.2d 1440, 1447 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We hold that the duty of candor and good faith in the 
reexamination proceeding applies to both the requester and the patent defender, as well as to their 
respective attorneys and agents.”).  Recently there was a legislative attempt to clarify that the 
duty of candor extends to “parties adverse to a patent or application,” but the bill was not enacted.  
See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, S. 137, 109th Cong. (2005).  I thank Lisa Dolak for 
bringing this provision of the legislation to my attention. 
43  Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 09-CV-5157, slip op. 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009), aff’d, No. 2010-1189, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23707 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 
15, 2010).  The case here cited was filed in federal court after a California Court of Appeals 
unanimously held that Lockwood’s complaint (previously filed in California state court) 
presented a substantial question of federal patent law, and was thus subject to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.  See Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 93 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 220 (Ct. App. 2009). 
44  See Liz McKenzie, Sheppard Mullin Aims to Quash Lockwood Fraud Suit, Law360, Sept. 
14, 2009 (“Lockwood claims that the firm manipulated the dates on one of the publications 
submitted to the USPTO and misrepresented what [the other publications] actually disclosed.  
The USPTO may not have granted the re-examination had the firm not misrepresented 
information, the inventor argues.”). 




brought several state law claims against the defendants.45  The district court, however, 
dismissed the complaint, holding, inter alia, that “federal patent law preempts state law . . 
. claims” such as Lockwood’s—and disregarding well-settled Federal Circuit precedent 
that allows tort claims to go forward when the “conduct before the PTO [at issue] . . . 
amounted to fraud or rendered the . . . process a sham.”46
 The principal issue on appeal in Lockwood was whether the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee
 
47—which held that state law 
claims for fraud-on-the-FDA were preempted by a federal statutory scheme empowering 
the FDA to punish and deter fraud—applied to the PTO context and served to preempt 
Lockwood’s claims for malicious prosecution and fraud.  Though the oral argument 
suggests that the panel was sharply divided on the preemption question, ultimately the 
panel affirmed the district court without opinion.48  The  court’s stunning decision not to 
issue an opinion in a case involving the weighty question of whether state common law is 
preempted was the subject of some dismay within the patent community; one 
commentator remarked that “the Rule 36 opinion [in Lockwood] is surprising given the 
lack of precedent on this topic, the obvious third-party interest in the outcome of the case, 
and the dramatic rise in the use of reexaminations over the past decade,” concluding that 
the outcome of “this case opens the door to some amount of bad-behavior in the filing of 
reexamination requests.”49
                                                     
45  Lockwood also brought civil RICO claims against the defendants, and these were also 
dismissed by the district court.  However, given the difficulties involved in pleading RICO, it 
cannot be considered the remedy of first resort for victims of unwarranted reexamination 
proceedings. 
  Moreover, the Lockwood case presented the court with 
multiple issues of first impression, and seemingly met most of the court’s own criteria 
46  Hunter Douglas Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see 
also Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (when a tort claim 
“does not present an obstacle to the execution and accomplishment” of the federal patent laws, it 
is not preempted); Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (tort action 
allowed when “it is shown that the entire federal agency action was a ‘sham’”). 
47  531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
48  See Fed. Cir. R. 36 (permitting court to “enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion . 
. . when it determines that . . . an opinion would have no precedential value”). 
49  See Dennis Crouch, Untouchable: Sham Reexamination Requests, Patently-O, Nov. 15, 
2010, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/11/untouchable-sham-reexamination-requests.html.  
Other practitioners remarked that “although the case is non-precedential, the result in this case 
would seem to make it more difficult to challenge third party requesters filing a reexamination 
request, even if there are allegations that the requests were fraudulent.”  See also Federal Circuit 
Affirms District Court’s Dismissal of Sham-Reexamination Lawsuit, The Reexamination Center, 
Nov. 17, 2010, http://reexamcenter.com/2010/11/federal-circuit-affirms-district-court’s-
dismissal-of-sham-reexamination-lawsuit/. 





 Whatever the reason for the panel’s reluctance to decide these questions, the 
result has perpetuated uncertainty as to whether patent holders have any recourse when 
they are effectively deprived of their patent rights through wrongfully instigated 
reexamination proceedings.  Although nonprecedential, the Federal Circuit’s Lockwood 
decision erects a significant hurdle to future inventors seeking state law remedies for the 
harm resulting from unwarranted reexamination proceedings.  Until these issues are 
raised anew, unscrupulous requesters need not fear liability for misconduct that harms 
patent holders.  The Federal Circuit has effectively sent a signal that it is now “open 
season” to flood the PTO with meritless requests for reexamination designed for no other 
purpose than to harass patent holders.
   
51
 Such a state of affairs, if allowed to continue, will inevitably threaten the quid pro 
quo of the patent system, jeopardizing the objective of disclosure
  Under the current ruling, there would seem to be 
little to discourage anyone from using the reexamination process to render patent rights a 
nullity. 
52
                                                     
50  The Federal Circuit states that “[t]he court’s policy is to limit precedent to dispositions 
meeting one or more of” fourteen separate criteria identified as (a) – (n).  See United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Internal Operating Procedures, available at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rules-of-practice/IOP.pdf.  Of the court’s own 
criteria, Lockwood met at least eight: Lockwood (a) was a test case, determining whether patent 
holders would have a private right of action and remedy for unwarranted reexamination 
proceedings; (b) raised issues of first impression; (c) would have established a new rule of law 
regarding tort claims premised on “sham” reexamination proceedings; (e) required the application 
of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent to facts significantly different from those on 
which the case law is based; (f) presented a possible conflict between the “sham exception” to 
preemption created by Federal Circuit precedent, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckman; 
(g) raised an issue never treated by the court, and of substantial interest to amici supporting both 
parties and to the patent community generally, affecting the rights of all future patent holders 
subject to reexamination; (h) presented a significantly new factual situation, relevant to all future 
patent holders subject to reexamination; and (i) required a new interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Buckman, which dealt with preemption in the context of a different federal 
agency (the FDA) and with respect to a tort claim different from the malicious prosecution claim 
at issue in Lockwood. 
 by weakening the 
51  Cf. Jason S. Oliver, Reexamining the Meaning of a “Substantial New Question of 
Patentability”: Amending the Patent Reexamination Provision’s Threshold Requirement, 53 
Syracuse L. Rev. 1093, 1108-09 (2003) (“[I]t is important to understand that the act of initiating a 
patent reexamination proceeding should not be trivialized to the point at which reexamination 
becomes automatic, or undo [sic] harassment of the patentee proliferates.”). 
52  Cf. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944); 
Katherine M. Zandy, Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?  A Goldilocks Approach to Patent 
Reexamination Reform, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 865, 889 (2006) (“Subjecting patent 
holders to a constant onslaught of cheap, easy-to-pursue patent reexaminations would force an 
unfair burden on them.  It could also cause fewer patents in the long run, as inventers turn to other 
avenues of protection, such as trade secret law, instead of risky patenting.”). 




patent right of exclusion, and imperiling (according to one estimate) more than $57 
billion in receipts from the licensing of U.S. intellectual property.53  Patents would be in 
danger of “becom[ing] little more than publications which create ill-defined and 
evanescent rights.”54  The public, although not the direct target of the fraud, will 
nonetheless suffer from a weakened patent system and less technological innovation.  
PTO Director David Kappos recently said that “[e]very patent application that we sit on 
is an American job not being created.”55  By the same token, for every patent whose 
value is diminished by unwarranted reexamination, existing American jobs are 
threatened: as Director Kappos subsequently acknowledged, “there are lots and lots of 
jobs riding on the patents we have in reexamination.”56  Startup companies, for whom 
patents can be critical to secure financing,57
 Accordingly, it is of the utmost importance that this problem be explored in a 
rigorous and scholarly manner, so that Congress, the courts, the patent bar, and industry 
alike may be in the best position possible to collaborate in crafting a satisfactory solution.  
This article is submitted as the first attempt to do so.  Although the literature dealing with 
inequitable conduct by patent applicants is vast, none of it has yet explored misconduct 
perpetrated by third parties
 will find it more difficult to create jobs.  
Their patents can be vitiated by reexaminations, and the patent right in general will be 
perceived as too weak to protect investment. 
58
                                                     
53  Kate McElhone, Inequitable Conduct: Shifting Standards for Patent Applicants, 
Prosecutors, and Litigators, 17 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 385, 386 n.2 (2009), citing 1 Nat’l Sci. Bd., 
Nat’l Sci. Found., Science and Engineering Indicators 2008, at 6-31 (2008), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/pdf/volume1.pdf. 
 before the PTO.  The possibility that reexamination 
proceedings might be subject to abuse of this kind, although contemplated as they were 
54  William G. Conger, Comment, Patent Reexamination Reexamined, 1986 Det. C.L. Rev. 
523, 542 (1986). 
55  John Schmid, Congress Deals Funding Blow to Patent Office, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, 
Dec. 29, 2009. 
56  David Kappos, Improving the Reexamination Process, June 6, 2010, Director’s Forum: 
David Kappos’ Public Blog, 
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/improving_the_reexamination_process. 
57  See Ronald J. Mann and Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-
ups, 36 Res. Pol’y 193 (2007) (finding significant correlation between patenting and, among other 
things, rounds of financing, total investment, late-stage financing, firm longevity). 
58  By “third party,” I refer to a party requesting reexamination which is neither the patent 
holder himself nor the PTO, but a third party wishing to challenge the patent’s validity.  The 
third-party requester is usually a rival of the patent holder and very often has been sued by him 
for patent infringement, or threatened with suit.  In a few cases, the third party may be an 
industry-wide consortium or non-profit interest group. 




being passed into law and in a few instances thereafter,59 has never been the sole focus of 
scholarship.  This does not mean the phenomenon is too rare to be a matter of concern.  
To the contrary, I identify numerous allegations of such conduct60 in addition to the 
Lockwood case.  Moreover, in view of patent reform initiatives recently under 
consideration by Congress—proposals which only expand the opportunities for abuse by 
proposing a third form of reexamination proceeding61
 This article will proceed as follows: Section II will explore the realities of the 
patent reexamination process and its impact on patent holders.  Section III will consider 
the ways in which reexamination is particularly vulnerable to abuse, survey the burdens 
of the process for patent holders, and look closely at several instances in which patent 
holders complained of misconduct by the requester.  Section IV will examine the 
Lockwood case and present several reasons why a different approach is compelled both 
by caselaw and considerations of sound public policy.  Finally, Section V will conclude 
with a number of proposals which, if enacted, might better protect current and future 
variants of the reexamination process from abuse. 
 marred by many of the same 
vulnerabilities as those which currently exist—a full investigation of these issues could 
not be more pressing. 
                                                     
59  See Raymond Alexander Mercado, New Light on the Blackberry Litigation, IP L. & Bus., 
Aug. 5, 2008, at 11-14 (describing attempts of counsel for third-party requester to obtain off-the-
record interviews with PTO officials regarding the status of the reexams, though such interviews 
are prohibited by, e.g., 37 C.F.R. 1.560(a) (“Requests that reexamination requesters participate in 
interviews with examiners will not be granted.”) and 37 C.F.R. 1.955 (“Interviews prohibited in 
inter partes reexamination proceedings.”)); see also Robert Greene Sterne, Kenneth C. Bass, III, 
Jon E. Wright & Lori A. Gordon, Reexamination Practice with Concurrent District Court or 
USITC Patent Litigation, (paper presented at The Association of Corporate Patent Counsel 
Annual Meeting, Jan. 26, 2009) at 19 n.50 (referring to the possibility of “‘reverse’ inequitable 
conduct” being found for third-party “requester submissions [that are] clearly hiding the ball from 
reexamination examiners” and stating that “we know the PTO is thinking about these issues”); 
Blair Silver, Controlling Patent Trolling With Civil RICO, 11 Yale J.L. & Tech. 70, 91 (2009) 
(contemplating the applicability of civil RICO to the context of various post-grant proceedings 
before the PTO, but concluding with respect to existing reexamination procedures that “[t]he 
limited scope of review in reexamination suggests a lower possibility for fraud” and that “filings 
during these proceedings are likely not to qualify as predicate acts under civil RICO”); Zandy, 
supra note 51, at 889-92 (predicting that much-expanded use of reexamination procedures is 
likely to invite harassment and inequitable conduct by third-party requesters); William J. 
Speranza and Michael L. Goldman, Reexamination – The Patent Challenger’s View, 69 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 295, 296 (1987) (“[R]eexamination . . . has potential for misuse by the 
patent challenger to achieve less-than-noble aims, such as delay or harassment, in an effort to 
escape liability where no legitimate defense exists.”). 
60  See infra Section III.D. 
61  The Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2010) provides for a new form of 
reexamination proceeding, a so-called post-grant review, in addition to existing ex parte and inter 
partes reexamination procedures.  One would have hoped that Congress would begin by mending 
current procedures before creating new opportunities for wrongdoing. 





II.  THE IMPACT OF REEXAMINATION ON PATENT LICENSING AND ENFORCEMENT  
A. Overview  
 The reexamination statute was enacted to provide a mechanism for correcting 
PTO errors in patent issuance and for thereby restoring confidence in overall patent 
validity.62  However, Congress emphatically did not intend for the reexamination process 
to introduce new opportunities for harassment, recognizing that its “broad purpose must 
be balanced against the potential for abuse, whereby unwarranted reexaminations can 
harass the patentee and waste the patent life.”63  Yet gamesmanship of the reexamination 
process has, in the view of some, become more the rule than the exception.  Reportedly it 
has become “standard procedure” that a defendant in patent litigation “take an aggressive 
stance by saying it plans to request a re-exam on that patent-in-suit or even all” of the 
plaintiff’s patents.64  The threat of reexamination is then used as leverage in licensing 
negotiations,65 intimidating patent-holders into settling out of court for lower amounts 
than those to which the value of their patents might entitle them.66
                                                     
62  See Patlex I, 758 F.2d 594, 608 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“We view the reexamination statute as 
of the class of ‘curative’ statutes, designed to cure defects in an administrative system.”); but see 
Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System 
for U.S. Patent Law, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (1997) (arguing that reexamination’s aim of 
providing a curative mechanism—originating, as it did, in a desire to resuscitate the presumption 
of validity, which in Janis’s view has now become sufficiently strong—should now yield to other 
policy considerations, such as providing a true alternative to litigation, necessitating the 
replacement of existing reexamination procedures with a new “administrative revocation system” 
for patents). 
 
63  In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
64  Erin Coe, Patent Re-Exams Are Growing as Key Defense Tactic, Law360, Oct. 23, 2008. 
65  See Handal, supra note 19, at 254 (“[A] party threatened with litigation has the 
opportunity to file reexamination requests on the patents concerned, or without doing anything, 
has the threat of such action to use in any negotiation which may be in progress.  Likewise, a 
threatened party also has the opportunity of putting a number of patents into reexamination which 
are not even related to the subject matter of the threat.  Thus, even where the party threatened 
with litigation is in a relatively weak position with respect to the asserted patents, he can very 
viably threaten to retaliate against the patent owner by counter-attacking where the patent owner 
is in a relatively weak position.”). 
66  Id. Ironically, Congress intended that the reexamination process should have just the 
opposite effect: “Patent office reexamination will greatly reduce, if not end, the threat of legal 
costs being used to ‘blackmail’ such [patent-] holders into allowing patent infringements or being 
 




 Third-party requesters are savvy about the consequences of reexamination on the 
enforceability of patents, and they know that the threat of filing reexamination is often 
effective.  As the Executive Director of the Public Patent Foundation (a non-profit 
organization that files reexaminations against patents it deems questionable) has 
explained, a patent in reexamination is “like a lame duck president . . . [h]e’s technically 
president, but does Congress really need to negotiate with him to get things passed?”67
 One practitioner has noted that a reexamination proceeding “puts [the patent’s 
scope] in uncertain terms . . . [and consequently] a patent holder has to wait to assert 
claims and that harms enforceability.”
  In 
conferring “lame-duck status” to a patent, reexamination can essentially render the patent 
right void in the eyes of all those wishing to make use of the invention without 
compensating the patent owner. 
68  Reexaminations can thus be extremely 
damaging to patent holders even when instigated by third parties acting within the letter 
of the law.  Although reexamination is statutorily required to be conducted with “special 
dispatch,”69 in practice the proceedings can take years to complete.70  Even when a 
reexamination is actually merited and prior art proves a patent’s scope to have been too 
broad, the proceeding can last more than half the patent term, as can be seen from two 
reexaminations of almost legendary length: the 9-year reexamination of the so-called 
“Compton” patent71 and the nearly 12-year reexamination of the Billings patent.72
                                                                                                                                                              
forced to license their patents for nominal fees.”  H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980), 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6463. 
  An 
67  Terri Somers, Sweeping Stem Cell Patents Rejected, San Diego Union-Trib., Apr. 3, 
2007, at A10. 
68  Erin Coe, Re-Exam Delays Cause Trouble for Patent Owners, Law360, Mar. 24, 2009 
(quoting attorney Rajiv P. Patel). 
69  See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2010). 
70  Similarly, the substance of the proceeding can take years to begin.  Once the PTO has 
made its determination to initiate reexamination, it can take many months before the Office will 
issue an “office action” or ruling as to the validity of the claims.  In one of the Lockwood 
reexaminations, the PTO did not issue a first office action on the merits until two years after the 
reexamination was requested, despite numerous inquiries from the patent holder’s attorney into 
the status of the first office action.  Nineteen months into the reexamination, Lockwood’s attorney 
protested in a letter to the PTO that the “file has already passed through four examiners, and the 
patent owner is still awaiting a first office action.  Important licensing agreements depend upon 
the outcome of this re-examination.  The patent owner is being severely damaged by the undue 
delay.  We request that the file be given the urgent priority it now deserves.”  Miscellaneous 
Incoming Letter, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,289,319, Control No. 90/006,623 
(Dec. 21, 2004).  The first office action would not arrive, however, for another five months. 
71  U.S. Patent No. 5,241,671 was issued to Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., in October 1989.  
The CEO of Compton’s NewMedia (an Encyclopaedia subsidiary), Stanley Frank, announced 
that “[e]verything that is now multimedia and computer-based utilizes this invention,” prompting 
 




inventor can lose years of patent life, though in the end only a slight narrowing of the 
patent’s claims might have been all that was needed to sustain its validity over the prior 
art.  “That’s what’s so pernicious about re-exams,” one patent holder has commented, 
“the patent life wastes while the PTO does nothing.”73
 Former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, recognizing the lengthy 
duration of reexaminations, recently registered his skeptical view of the process: 
 
To me, the proposed alternative for weeding out bad patents is unconvincing.  Can we 
really get a faster, better, and cheaper review of challenged patents at the PTO than in the 
courts?  Experience with the existing PTO reexamination procedures raises doubts.  And 
the PTO is already overwhelmed by ex parte [re]examinations with average pendencies 
of over three years, in some arts, far longer.74
 Although reexamination proceedings take years to conclude, meanwhile severely 
undermining the inventor’s opportunity to enforce, sell, license, or otherwise benefit from 
his property rights,
 
75 no provision for patent term extension now exists—even when the 
patent’s validity is confirmed at the end of the proceeding.76
                                                                                                                                                              
an industry outcry.  John Eckhouse, Key Patent to Shake Multimedia Industry, S.F. Chron., Nov. 
15, 1993.  In response, PTO took the unusual step of ordering reexamination on its own initiative 
in December 1993.  The reexamination, which resulted in several claim amendments, was 
concluded only in July 2002.  For a highly critical account of the circumstances surrounding the 
Compton reexamination, see Terri Suzette Hughes, Patent Reexamination and the PTO: 
Compton’s Patent Invalidated at the Commissioner’s Request, 14 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. 
L. 379 (1996). 
  As another patent 
practitioner has observed, “[i]f a district court judge decides to grant a stay [of the patent-
holder’s enforcement litigation], a patent owner may be destroyed.  Some re-exams could 
72  U.S. Patent No. 4,714,989 was issued to inventor Roger E. Billings in October 1986.  
Subsequently, Billings attempted to enforce his patent against Novell, Inc., which requested 
reexamination in June 1994; reexamination was initiated in August 1994 and concluded only in 
January of 2006. 
73  See Mercado, supra note 58, at 12 (quoting the president of patent-holding company 
NTP, Inc.). 
74  Former Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, Address at the Federal Trade Commission Hearing 
on the Evolving IP Marketplace: Where Are We Now on Patent System Improvements and How 
Can We Best Make Further Progress? (Dec. 5, 2008). 
75  Patlex I, 758 F.2d 594, 599-600 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[P]atent property rights, necessarily 
including the right ‘to license and exploit patents’, fall squarely within both classical and judicial 
definitions of protectable property . . . [and] the right to exclude . . . is implemented by the 
licensing and exploitation of patents.”). 
76  Yet 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) provides for term extension owing to PTO delays during the 
application process.  35 U.S.C. §155 and 156 provide for term extension under other 
circumstances. 




take five to 10 years to complete.”77
 By one count, reexamination requests from companies accused of patent 
infringement have recently more than tripled,
 
78 and motions by defendants to stay patent 
litigation until the conclusion of reexamination are being granted more than 60% of the 
time.79  An informal study estimated that certain districts, such as the Northern District of 
Illinois and the Northern District of California, are granting motions to stay litigation 
pending reexamination approximately 85% and 65% of the time, respectively.80  Indeed, 
many courts in the Northern District of California have maintained a “liberal policy in 
favor of granting motions to stay . . . pending the outcome” of PTO reexamination 
proceedings.81  By contrast, courts in the Eastern District of Texas,82 recognizing the 
“potential for use of the reexamination process as a dilatory tactic” and concluding that 
such a policy would effectively “elevate” reexamination into a “requisite procedure 
before a lawsuit may move forward,” have stated that “there exists no policy [in this 
district] to routinely grant such motions.”83
                                                     
77  See Coe, supra note 63. 
  One practitioner has opined that “it is 
78  Joseph Rosenbloom, The Reexamination Gamble, IP L. & Bus., July 1, 2008, at 31. 
79  Id. at 32. 
80  See Matthew Smith, Stays Pending Reexamination, Patently-O, Nov. 1, 2009, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/11/the-following-guest-post-is-by-matthew-smiththe-
grant-rate-of-motions-to-stay-is-highly-judge-dependent-and-somewhat-less-ob.html. 
81  Like.com v. Superfish, Inc., No. 09-CV-5805-SBA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70458, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010) (citing ASCII Corp. v. STD Entm’t USA, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1378, 1381 
(N.D. Cal. 1994)). 
82  Smith’s study, supra note 79, finds that the Eastern District of Texas grants such stays 
only 20% of the time, making it one of the few fora where motions to stay pending reexamination 
seem to be heard with disfavor. 
83  Nidec Corp. v. LG Innotek Co., Ltd., No. 6:07CV108, 2009 WL 3673433, at *6 (E.D. 
Tex. Apr. 3, 2009).  However, in Nidec these considerations merely led the court to conclude that 
the “simplification of issues” factor was a “neutral” one in determining whether to grant or deny 
the stay.  In deciding to deny the stay, the court was animated more by the possibility that “where 
the parties are direct competitors,” staying the litigation “will not only compound Plaintiff’s 
damages during the course of the stay, but it could also cause Plaintiff irreparable injury that is 
not remediable by money damages.”  Id., at *3-4; see also O2 Micro Int’l Ltd v. Beyond 
Innovation, No. 2-04-CV-32 (TJW), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87352, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 
2008) (“The parties are direct competitors in the market and a denial of timely enforcement of the 
plaintiff’s patent rights does indeed unduly prejudice the plaintiff.”).  Obviously this gives little 
solace to patent holders who are unable or unwilling to engage in the business of practicing their 
inventions.  More encouragingly, in Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 
660, 662-63 (E.D. Tex. 2005), the court stated without reference to the businesses of the litigants 
that it was “unwilling to adopt a per se rule that patent cases should be stated during 
 




somewhat ironic . . . that courts view . . . reexamination favorably as an antidote that 
shortens litigation when in fact it averages a delay of 19 months.”84  The practice of filing 
requests for reexamination in order to stay the lawsuit has become so routine that failure 
to do so has formed the basis for a recent malpractice lawsuit, in which the plaintiff 
complained that “[p]roper pursuit of a patent reexamination could have resulted in a stay 
of the . . . litigation for a substantial period of time,” observing that “[a]lthough 
technically a stay, the reexamination process often serves to effectively end the patent 
litigation in many cases and could have terminated [this] case.”85
 Appreciating the tendency of defendants to use reexamination proceedings as a 
basis for moving to stay litigation, a few judges have refused to “sanction the most 
blatant abuse of the reexamination process” and have chastised defendants for attempting 
to “game the system.”
 
86  However, this has typically been limited to instances in which 
reexamination was sought at a late87 stage of litigation.88
                                                                                                                                                              
reexamination because . . . [t]o do so would not promote the efficient and timely resolution of 
patent cases, but would invite parties to unilaterally derail timely patent case resolution by 
seeking reexamination.” 
 
84  Allen M. Leung, Legal Judo: Strategic Applications of Reexamination Versus an 
Aggressive Adversary (Part II), 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 553, 558 (2002) (citing Wayne 
O. Stacy, Reexamination Reality: How Courts Should Approach a Motion to Stay Litigation 
Pending the Outcome of Reexamination, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 172, 193 app. A (1997)).  Since 
Stacy’s article was published, the average pendency of reexamination has increased from 19 
months to 25 months.  See Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data, June 30, 2010, at 2 (PTO’s 
statistics), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/EP_quarterly_report_June_30_2010.pdf. 
85  Complaint at 7, Ecast Inc. v. Morrison & Foerster LLP, No. CGC-09-487063 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., Apr. 8, 2009). 
86  Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C03-1431SBA, 2007 WL 
1655625, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2007) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to stay the declaratory 
judgment action in view of requests for reexamination filed at an advanced phase of the 
litigation). 
87  See Christopher M. Pickett, The Patent Reexamination Procedure — A Complete Guide 
Through the Statutes, the Rules and the Caselaw, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 297, 311 
(1993) (recognizing that “there is some potential for a party to so abuse the system by applying 
for a reexamination of a patent after a lengthy and costly discovery period”). 
88  See Delta Frangible Ammunition, LLC v. Sinterfire, Inc., No. 06-1477, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 78999, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2008) (denying stay, noting that “[c]ourts are wary of” 
motions to stay that “suggest potential attempts to manipulate the reexamination process,” and 
that “[d]efendant’s delay of approximately 22 months since the filing of [the] lawsuit to request 
reexamination further amplifies [the c]ourt’s concerns”); see also Musco Corp. v. Qualite, Inc., 
No. 1:94-CV-592, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 972, at *9 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (denying defendant’s 
motion to stay when it was brought after trial, and finding that “such abuse of the re-examination 
process is intolerable”); Freeman v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Del. 
1987) (opining that a motion to stay would be “a mere dilatory tactic” where defendant had been 
 




 The level of familiarity with the realities of patent reexamination at the district 
court level is itself a problem.  “A lot of district court judges don’t understand what is 
really going on in the re-exam world,” admits one attorney.89  During a hearing in a case 
herein discussed, counsel for the defendant and third-party requester responded to the 
judge’s inquiry regarding how often patents are reexamined by telling her “maybe one 
percent . . . I think one percent of the requests [are] granted,”90 when in fact 
approximately 94% of requests for reexamination are granted.91
 When it passed the original reexamination procedure into law, Congress had 
sought to strengthen “investor confidence in the certainty of patent rights”
  Clearly a federal 
judiciary better informed about patent reexamination would prevent misleading 
statements from counsel whose memories appear to fail them.  At the very least, one 
could say that better efforts are needed from advocates to prevent misinformation from 
improperly influencing the judiciary. 
92 and 
“promote industrial innovation by assuring the kind of certainty about patent validity 
which is a necessary ingredient of sound investment decisions.”93  In practice, however, 
reexamination has done much to diminish that certainty.  Investors lose confidence in the 
value of patent rights from the moment reexamination is initiated.94
                                                                                                                                                              
aware of prior art on which reexamination would be based for at least eight months before filing 
the request for reexamination, and where the case had been pending for more than two years); 
Digital Magnetic Sys., Inc. v. Ansley, No. CIV-81-1190-T, 1982 WL 52160, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 
1982) (cautioning that “[p]arties should not be permitted to abuse the process by applying for 
reexamination after protracted, expensive discovery or trial preparation” but acknowledging that 
“in cases . . . which have not progressed beyond the initial litigation stages . . . the reexamination 
procedure should be utilized”). 
  And for companies 
especially dependent on their intellectual property, the uncertainty of reexamination can 
89  Coe, supra note 63. 
90  Counsel had been registered to practice before the PTO for more than 15 years at the time 
of this misstatement.  Transcript of Tutorial and Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 
78-79, Pergo, Inc. v. Faus Group, Inc., No. 5:05-CV-50-FL(1) (E.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2005).  See 
infra Section III.D.2 for further discussion of the case. 
91  Of 614 determinations on requests for ex parte reexamination during Fiscal Year 2009, 
the PTO granted 574, or about 94%.  See USPTO Performance and Accountability Report for 
Fiscal Year 2009, supra note 38, at 124 tbl.13A. 
92  See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6462. 
93  Id. at 6463. 
94  Former Chief Judge Michel has argued in a broad sense that when the value of patents 
decreases, “corporate wealth will suffer.  Research and development budgets will almost certainly 
go down.  Therefore, innovation will go down.  Therefore, the infrastructure on which our future 
prosperity as a country heavily rests will be significantly threatened, in my judgment.”  Michel, 
supra note 27. 




do great damage to shareholder value, as was recently observed when Tessera 
Technologies’ stock fell by 39% in a single day95 due to a preliminary ruling in a 
reexamination.  Reexamination can also have a severe impact upon the operations of such 
companies, as was seen when Avistar Communications Corp. was forced to lay off 25% 
of its work force shortly after challenges were filed against its entire patent portfolio.96
 All these things point toward flaws in existing reexamination procedures,
 
97 but 
most disturbing are the allegations that many third parties requesting reexaminations have 
deceived the PTO into granting them through inequitable conduct or outright fraud.  The 
misconduct complained of has taken multiple forms, including: the withholding98 or 
misrepresentation99 of material information concerning the date and public accessibility 
of purported prior art; alterations of drawings and figures contained in prior art;100 
deliberate mistranslation of foreign prior art;101 and false statements as to the contents of 
prior art.102
                                                     
95  The one-day loss represented more than $437 million in shareholder value. 
  That falsifying prior art, or withholding material information about it, should 
96  Avistar’s CEO stated “This single action against Avistar’s complete U.S. patent portfolio 
[of 29 patents] represents over 5 percent of the entire 2007 third-party re-examination challenges 
at the USPTO.”  Avistar to Cut 25% of Staff, Says Microsoft’s Patent Challenge Largely to 
Blame, Silicon Valley / San Jose Bus. J., Mar. 26, 2008.  
97  Even John M. Whealan, during his tenure as Deputy General Counsel for Intellectual 
Property Law and Solicitor at the PTO, candidly admitted that “the reexamination system . . . did 
not work well.”  Remarks of John M. Whealan at The Fifth Annual Hot Topics in Intellectual 
Property Law Symposium at Duke University Law School, available at 
http://realserver.law.duke.edu/ramgen/spring06/students/02172006b.rm.  The steps he touted as 
having been taken by the PTO to improve the system—consisting essentially in placing more 
experienced patent examiners in charge of reexamination—do little, unfortunately, to address the 
issue raised here. 
98  See Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ Prods., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1355, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 
1995) (finding that defendants withheld material information from the PTO bearing on the date 
and public accessibility of purported prior art). 
99  See Complaint at 16-17, Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 
09-CV-5157 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (alleging that defendants misrepresented the dates and 
public accessibility of purported prior art in their requests for reexamination). 
100  See infra Section III.D.1-2 for alleged examples of such alteration. 
101  See infra Section III.D.1 for an alleged example of deliberate mistranslation. 
102  See Complaint at 16-23, Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 
09-CV-5157 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (further alleging that defendants misrepresented the 
contents of prior art); see infra Section III.D.3 for discussion of the Acumed reexamination, in 
which the patent holder alleged that the requester submitted a declaration which was misleading 
 




constitute inequitable conduct is plain.103  But inequitable conduct can also encompass 
misrepresentation of material fact, the proffering of “gross mischaracterizations or 
unreasonable interpretations”104
                                                                                                                                                              
as to the contents of a submitted reference and failed to submit prior art that would have shown 
how the reference did not, in fact, read on the patent’s claims. 
 before the PTO—as distinguished from mere attorney 
argument or the kind of zealous advocacy to which any client would be entitled.  The 
reexamination process is especially vulnerable to these latter forms of misconduct 
103  Cf. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 439 F.2d 1369, 1378-79 (5th Cir. 
1970) (“The Patent Office does not have full research facilities of its own, and it has never been 
intended by Congress that it should.  In examining patents, the Office relies heavily upon the 
prior art references that are cited to it by applicants.  It is therefore evident that our patent system 
could not function successfully if applicants were allowed to approach the Patent Office as an 
arm’s length adversary.”). 
104  See Young v. Lumenis, 492 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Elan Corp. PLC v. 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 07-552-SLR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17807, at *2 (D. Del. 2008) 
(holding that although “attorneys are permitted to advocate for their own interpretation of the 
prior art before an examiner, nonetheless, arguments made to the PTO can form the basis for 
inequitable conduct”); Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (holding that repeated arguments that claims were entitled to the benefit of earlier 
filing dates, where a BPAI decision as to earlier patents implied otherwise, constituted 
“affirmative misrepresentations”); Braintree Lab., Inc. v. Nephro-Tech, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 
1134 (D. Kan. 2000) (“[T]hat the prior art is independently considered by the PTO does not 
alleviate the applicant’s duty of candor to the PTO, and, therefore, a deliberate misrepresentation 
of the prior art’s teaching, if sufficiently material, may justify a finding of inequitable conduct.”) 
(citing Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[L]apse 
on the part of an examiner does not exculpate an applicant whose acts are intentionally deceptive 
. . . .”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990)); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. SciMed Life 
Sys., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“[I]f there is evidence of an intent to deceive 
the patent examiner, there can be inequitable conduct even if the misrepresented prior art is 
before the patent examiner . . . .”); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
Ltd., 4 F. Supp. 2d. 477, 495 n.36 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“It is worth noting that advocacy before the 
PTO is appropriate.  But, there is a line between legitimate advocacy in accordance with the duty 
of candor, and advocacy that the applicant surely knows has a propensity to mislead the 
examiner.”), recons. denied, 24 F. Supp. 2d 537, 542 (E.D. Va. 1998), aff’d on other grounds, 
204 F.3d  1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 
1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“overstatements” and “exaggerations” regarding a prior art 
reference could “rise to the level of gross falsification”); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 617 
F. Supp. 1382, 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (argument distinguishing invention from prior art was an 
“affirmatively misleading representation”), aff’d 798 F.2d 1392, 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  Cf. Rene 
D. Tegtmeyer, Policy Issues in Implementing Reexamination, 9 AIPLA Q.J. 214, 225 (1981) 
(“The duty [of disclosure] in reexamination extends to . . . assertions which can be considered in 
reexamination proceedings by the PTO.”) (emphasis added).  The duty referred to by Tegtmeyer 
is, of course, that of the patent owner, but it suggests that some candor is required even in the 
statements one makes to the PTO, and it seems clear that this duty extends to those requesting 
reexamination. 




because, once it begins (though under false pretenses), it cannot be stopped,105
B. Reexamination Results in a Deprivation of Patent Rights 
 and the 
harm inures to the patent-holder.  And while the majority of requests for reexamination 
are surely made in good faith, the seriousness of the alleged abuse forces us to consider 
the ways in which the reexamination process is susceptible to bad faith from the third 
party requester. 
 To the foregoing, the counterargument might be raised that the patent holder 
suffers no real harm from reexamination since, after all, a patent remains technically in 
force throughout the proceeding and any cancellation of claims will not become final 
until the patent holder has exhausted all appeals.  Although stays of litigation are much 
more commonly granted than denied, they are of course made at the court’s discretion,106 
and the presence of a reexamination cannot assuredly derail a patent holder’s 
enforcement litigation or tie the hands of potential licensees.  Nevertheless, it would be 
an absurd formalism to deny that unwarranted reexamination results in a deprivation of 
patent rights.107
 The Federal Circuit, a few years after the reexamination process was instituted, 
asserted: 
 
[T]he effect, if any, of reexamination is temporary with respect to 
correctly granted patents.  If the patents are upheld upon reexamination 
[the patent holder] will continue to possess the entire bundle of property 
rights that accompany a valid patent. . . . [He] may recover damages from 
those who have infringed in the interim.  The full recompense that [he] 
seeks in his licensing program is not barred from ultimate recovery.108
In Patlex II, the court slightly rephrased this assertion, stating that the “ramifications of 
 
                                                     
105  See infra note 129 and accompanying text for further discussion of this problem of inertia 
in reexamination, including a narrow possibility of escaping that inertia by filing a petition to 
vacate under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181.  In inter partes reexaminations, which are much rarer than the ex 
parte variety, there is apparently a possibility of terminating the reexamination if the third-party 
requester stipulates in a concurrent litigation that it has failed to carry its burden of proving 
invalidity.  For a discussion, see the excellent and comprehensive treatise, Matthew A. Smith, 
Inter Partes Reexamination, 233–34 (1st ed., West 2008).  However, as Smith rightly notes, 
“[t]his approach is not likely to work for ex parte cases, because there are no express estoppel 
provisions.”  Id. at 234. 
106  See Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
107  See Handal, supra note 19, at 258 (“[T]he filing of a request for reexamination represents 
doing a sometimes substantial injury to the patentee.”). 
108  Patlex I, 758 F.2d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 




an erroneous decision [to initiate reexamination] . . . on [a patent holder’s] property 
interests is fairly viewed as the temporary deprivation of full enjoyment of patent rights, 
for the period needed to correct an erroneous determination to reexamine his patents.”109  
While technically correct, the court’s view in Patlex I and II does not take into account 
the full consequences of the reexamination process on patent rights.  Nor did the roughly 
contemporaneous view of the PTO, heedless as it was of the practical effects of 
reexamination, that “[n]o deprivation of [a] patent owner’s property interest results . . . 
[from] newly cited prior art being applied in [a rejection] in the reexamination.”110
 For example, it is quite possible, and in certain fast-moving industries such as the 
computer industry it is even likely, that a patented technology may have a very brief 
lifespan, entering widespread use and passing into obsolescence during the several-years-
long pendency of a reexamination proceeding.  Companies infringing the technology may 
well go out of business, making it impossible for inventors to collect the royalties they 
are owed.  Thus, the inventor can be deprived of the “best years” of his patent through 
reexamination, with greatly diminished opportunities to reap its economic rewards once it 
emerges from the process.  Clearly the failure of the Patlex court to appreciate this stems, 
in part, from an inadequate understanding of the effect that reexamination’s lengthy 
pendency would come to have in the decades subsequent to that case. 
 
 Although a pending reexamination does not prevent anyone from purchasing a 
patent license, it certainly does nothing to encourage it,111 and it provides users of the 
technology with every excuse for delay.  In the Lockwood case, several companies 
replied to the plaintiff with letters refusing his offer to sell them licenses for the 
technology, expressly stating that the existence of reexamination proceedings was the 
reason for their refusal.  The following statements112
 
 are representative of standard 
responses to a licensing offer made during reexamination: 
• “The prior art cited in these reexamination proceedings has led me to question 
whether or not your patents will emerge from the reexamination procedure with 
claims that will cover what my client is doing.  Therefore, I have advised my 
client not to accept your offer . . . at this time.  When your patents emerge from 
reexamination, my client would be glad to reconsider your offer.” 
 
• “Given that the two U.S. patents at issue . . . are currently the subject of 
reexamination proceedings . . . we are hesitant to enter into a license agreement . . 
. .” 
                                                     
109  Patlex II, 771 F.2d 480, 485 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
110  In re Burkner, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630, at 1633 (Comm’r. Pat. 1987). 
111  See Handal, supra note 19, at 259 (“[I]t would appear that there is a substantial 
possibility of abuse of the reexamination process, especially in connection with licensing.”). 
112  See Declaration of Lawrence B. Lockwood at 15-16, Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, 
Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 09-CV-5157 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009). 





• “I think that is [sic] would be prudent to wait until the re-examination process is 
completed.” 
 
 Again, the faith of Patlex I that patent holders “may recover damages from those 
who have infringed in the interim”113 was surely due, in part, to a rather conservative 
estimate of how long that “interim” would be.  Moreover, the court was considering 
reexamination in the light of plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to the patent 
reexamination statutes; the plaintiff in Patlex I did not allege that the request for 
reexamination had been brought for the purpose of harassment.  It was only in connection 
with this latter issue that the Federal Circuit would eventually concede that “unwarranted 
reexaminations can harass the patentee and waste the patent life.”114  Judge Newman 
observed that “a primary concern [of Congress] was the encumbrance on the patent 
during reexamination proceedings” and recognized the possibility that “the life of an 
issued patent be wasted and the patentee’s legitimate rights be abused by third party 
requests for reexamination.”115  Judge Rader—apparently disregarding the possibility that 
the PTO might be deceived by false evidence—has expressed the belief that “[t]he PTO 
has only undertaken reexaminations when genuine new questions of patentability 
warranted the process,”116 although in a later opinion he acknowledged that 
reexamination carries a “stigma or uncertainty regarding entitlement to the patent.”117
 More recently, there has been some evidence that courts are beginning to note the 
effects that reexamination can have on a patent holder’s licensing program,
 
118 and at least 
to admit the possibility that reexamination might waste the most valuable years of a 
patent’s life.119
                                                     
113  Patlex I, 758 F.2d at 603. 
  The view of Judge Newman herself—author of the Patlex opinions—has 
matured into the recognition that “if [reexamination is] routinely available to delay the 
114  In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
115  In re Lonardo, 119 F.3d 960, 969 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
116  In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 122 F.3d 1473, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J., 
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). 
117  Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
118  See Implicit Networks, Inc. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. C08-184JLR, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14467, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2009) (“[A]ny reticence on the part of a 
prospective licensee is caused by the reexamination procedure itself . . . .”). 
119  See Perricone v. Unimed Nutritional Servs., Inc., No. 3:01CV512(CFD), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17613, at *9 (D. Conn. July 18, 2002) (granting a motion to stay in part because “the 
patented invention at issue does not appear to be a short-lived technology, such as electronics or 
software, such that a stay of this case will permit the defendant to infringe upon the patented 
invention for the life of that invention”). 




judicial resolution of disputes, the procedure is subject to inequity, if not manipulation 
and abuse, through the delays that are inherent in PTO activity.”120
 The emerging consensus is that the very existence of reexamination proceedings 
does indeed have a harmful effect
 
121
III.  THE REEXAMINATION PROCESS  
 on patent holders, particularly unjust when the 
proceeding is instituted through inequitable conduct and without cause.  We must now 
turn our attention to the threshold standard designed to prevent unwarranted 
reexaminations from occurring in the first place. 
A. The Vulnerability of the SNQ Standard 
 The reexamination statutes Congress passed into law in 1980 provided that 
requests for reexamination must raise a “substantial new question of patentability” 
(hereinafter “SNQ”), a threshold requirement intended to “protect patentees from having 
to respond to, or participate in unjustified reexaminations,”122 e.g., those “brought for 
harassment or spite.”123  Thus, while any person124 at any time may request 
reexamination of a patent based upon prior art “patents [and] printed publications,”125 the 
reexamination will only be granted if the PTO determines that it raises an SNQ.126
                                                     
120  Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, 
J., concurring).  But see Photoflex Prods., Inc. v. Circa 3 LLC, No. C 04-03715 JSW, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 37743, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2006) (“The delay inherent to the reexamination 
does not constitute, by itself, undue prejudice.”). 
  One 
competing bill under consideration at the time had included the additional requirement 
121  Recall the holding of Dubilier and consider it with reference to the reexamination 
context: “[A] patent which does not carry with it the limited monopoly referred to in the 
Constitution is in reality not a patent at all.  The only value that a patent has is the right that it 
extends to the patentee to exclude all others from making, using, or selling the invention for a 
certain period of years.  A patent that is dedicated to the public is virtually the same as a patent 
that has expired.”  United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 202 (1933). 
122  H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 7 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6466. 
123  Patlex II, 771 F.2d 480, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
124  35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (2010).  Whereas anyone may file a request for an ex parte 
reexamination, and according to 37 C.F.R. § 1.510(b) may even do so anonymously, there are 
limits placed on those requesting inter partes reexamination.  Specifically, 37 C.F.R. § 1.913 
prohibits “the patent owner or its privies” from filing the request. 
125  35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2010). 
126  Id. 




that the requester present a “material reason” for the reexamination.127  PTO examiners 
recognized the “potential for harassment of patentees by multiple reexamination 
requests,” but it was thought that “[s]ince these are screened and also limited to new and 
substantial issues, the probability of harassment is minimized, particularly where a 
‘material reason’ is also required.”128
 The period during which the PTO determines whether the request raises an SNQ 
is the crucial stage of the reexamination process,
  Unfortunately, the requirement for a “material 
reason” was not present in the bill that ultimately became law. 
129 since the decision to grant a request 
for reexamination generally cannot be vacated130 and once reexamination is initiated, in 
the words of one practitioner, it “take[s] on a life of its own.”131
                                                     
127  Donald G. Daus, Reexamination: An Opportunity to Serve the Public, 62 J. Pat. Off. 
Soc’y 182 (1980); see also Conger, supra note 53, at 535 (noting that this “requirement . . . was 
allegedly to reduce the possibility of the use of reexamination as a tool for harassment”). 
  Yet the PTO has, by 
128  See Daus, supra note 126, at 183 (emphasis added). 
129  See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he substantial new question 
of patentability is the focal point of every reexamination.”). 
130  A narrow exception to this rule is the possibility of filing a petition to vacate under 37 
C.F.R. § 1.181, when the patent owner believes the PTO has exceeded its statutory authority in 
ordering reexamination.  Third-party requesters are given the right to file an opposition to such 
petitions within two weeks of filing.  See generally, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2246 (8th ed., rev. 7, July 2008) 
[hereinafter MPEP].  “Appropriate circumstances” for a petition to vacate include situations in 
which “the reexamination order is based wholly on the same question of patentability raised by 
the prior art previously considered in an earlier concluded examination of the patent by the Office 
. . . .”  Id., at 2200-64.  Given, however, the uncertainty regarding what constitutes an “old” 
versus a “new” question, which will be discussed later in this section, it is hardly to be believed 
that petitions made on this ground could often be successful in the current state of the law.  A 
second exception to this rule may be a petition to vacate under 37 C.F.R. § 1.182, where the 
patent holder can establish that the serial filing of reexamination requests is a form of 
harassment—for example, when the requester sends prior art to the PTO in piecemeal fashion, in 
multiple requests, and over time, rather than all at once in a single request, for the purpose of 
prolonging the period in which the patent remains in reexamination.  I am grateful to Stephen G. 
Kunin for bringing this second possible exception to my attention. 
131  See Sterne et al., supra note 58, at 25; see also Magas, supra note 29, at 173 (noting that 
even “if independent inventors succeed in winning a large judgment in court, the large companies 
at the other end of that verdict” may try to instigate reexamination).  Regarding this latter 
possibility, consider the following use of reexamination as illustrative: Immersion Corp. had been 
awarded $82 million in damages for infringement of two patents it asserted against Sony.  Yet 
Sony began filing requests for inter partes reexamination of the patents on the very day its post-
verdict motions were denied.  Accordingly, Immersion petitioned the PTO to dismiss or suspend 
the reexaminations.  In its decision, the PTO stated that although “there is no provision in the 
statute or rules for this type of petition, which asks for the extraordinary relief of terminating or 
 




statute, only three months to review the prior art submitted by a third party requester in 
order to determine whether it raises an SNQ.132  In view of the lengthy pendencies of 
entire reexamination proceedings, one can easily surmise how cursory133 the PTO review 
must inevitably be at this stage.  Nevertheless, the patent owner is not permitted to 
comment on the content of the request until after the decision as to the SNQ has been 
reached,134 thus depriving him of the opportunity to rebut any falsehoods if discovered.135
                                                                                                                                                              
suspending two inter partes reexaminations, the Office will consider the petitions in view of the 
unusual circumstances.”  In re Mark R. Tremblay, Control Nos. 95/000,093 and 95/000,094, at 1 
(Aug. 23, 2005).  It denied the petitions because the scope of the reexaminations was wider than 
the then-pending appeal to the Federal Circuit, as Sony had requested reexamination of both the 
litigated and unlitigated patent claims.  In response, Immersion statutorily disclaimed the two 
unlitigated claims and renewed its petitions to suspend the proceedings.  This time, the PTO 
granted the petitions to suspend the reexaminations, noting that “Immersion’s elimination of 
claim 1 in each proceeding aligns the claims and issues when comparing the two reexamination 
proceedings to the appeal now pending at the Federal Circuit,” and finding good cause based on 
the “strong possibility that the Federal Circuit’s [forthcoming] decision will estop the Office from 
issuing any decision at all.”  Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Dudas, No. 05-1447, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 36856, at *22 (E.D. Va. May 22, 2006) (quoting In re Mark R. Tremblay).  The 
patent owner was thus forced to relinquish part of its property rights (namely, the unlitigated 
claims) in order to stop reexamination proceedings that would have given Sony a third bite at the 
apple and further delayed resolution of the dispute.  Subsequently, Sony agreed to pay Immersion 
$150.3 million, which included the damages award with interest, and future licensing fees.  See 
Antone Gonsalves, Sony Agrees to Pay $150.3 Million in PlayStation Patent Suit, Info. Wk., Mar. 
2, 2007. 
  
132  See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2010); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.515(a) (2010). 
133  One indication of this is provided in the MPEP, which suggests that far less time than the 
statutory maximum of three months is actually used by examiners in determining whether to grant 
or deny the request.  See MPEP, supra note 129, § 2241, at 57 (urging that examiners “should 
take up a request for decision about 6 weeks after the request was filed,” and that “[t]he decision 
should be mailed within 10 weeks of the filing date of the request”) (emphasis added).  This 
would reduce the real time for decision to perhaps four weeks.   
134  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(a) (2010).  Recently, the PTO sought public comment on its 
proposal to allow patent-holders to reply to a request for reexamination before the examiner’s 
decision on the request: “Such a patent owner reply would address patentee concerns as to their 
current inability to address a request prior to an order.  Further, the patent owner’s input could 
improve the information/evidence and understanding of the issues before the examiner deciding 
the request.  That input should serve the purpose of reducing improper/unnecessary orders . . . 
[and] should enable the Office to be better able to weed out those requests that do not raise a 
substantial question of patentability, prior to instituting a full-blown proceeding.”  Revisions and 
Technical Corrections Affecting Requirements for Ex Parte and Inter Partes Reexaminations, 71 
Fed. Reg. 16072, 16073 (Mar. 30, 2006).  The PTO’s admission that “requests that do not raise a 
substantial question of patentability” might become “full-blown proceedings” through 
“improper/unnecessary orders” that initiate reexamination proceedings is telling, and suggestive 
of its concern with the abuse explored in this article.  The PTO subsequently declined, however, 
to adopt the rule it proposed. 




Moreover, a decision ordering reexamination is not appealable by the patent owner,136 
whereas the third party requester is afforded the chance to petition for review of a PTO 
decision denying the request.137
 If a requester can persuade the PTO to initiate reexamination, he will have 
succeeded at the very least in raising doubts throughout the marketplace as to the patent’s 
validity, and more importantly, the requester will usually have secured a solid basis for 
obtaining a stay of any infringement litigation filed against him.
 
138  Nor can the requester 
discount the possibility that the PTO may invalidate the patent on unexpected grounds; 
for example, by finding new prior art on its own initiative or by combining its art with 
that submitted with the request.139
                                                                                                                                                              
135  Cf. Conger, supra note 53, at 554 (“[T]he inability to respond at this point in the 
reexamination procedure seriously diminishes the patentee’s ability to escape reexamination 
unscathed, for it gives an adverse party the opportunity to present uncontroverted arguments in 
support of reexamination and invalidity at the very onset.”). 
  Judge Nies, in a concurrence joined by Judges Bissell 
136  See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[D]etermination of whether a 
‘substantial new question of patentability’ exists, and therefore whether reexamination may be 
had, is discretionary with the Commissioner, and, as § 303 provides, that determination is final, 
i.e., not subject to appeal.”) ; but see Heinl v. Godici, 143 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596-97 (E.D. Va. 
2001) (opining that “the statement in Etter concerning 303(c) was necessarily dictum” and that 
the “plain meaning [of 303(c)] . . . only bars judicial review of PTO decisions to deny 
reexamination”).  The Heinl court then proceeded to analyze the decision to grant reexamination 
as it pertained to the final agency action rule of the Administrative Procedure Act or any 
exceptions thereto, finding that “the PTO’s decision to allow reexamination of a patent is not 
‘final agency action’ and, therefore, is not subject to judicial review at this time” and that “no 
exception to that rule counsels otherwise in this case.”  Id. at 597, 604. 
137  Although 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) states that “[a] determination by the Director . . . that no 
substantial new question of patentability has been raised will be final and nonappealable,” 37 
C.F.R. § 1.515(c) provides that “[t]he requester may seek review by a petition to the Director 
under § 1.181 within one month of the mailing date of the examiner’s determination refusing ex 
parte reexamination.” 
138  See Rosenbloom, supra note 77, at 2 (finding that motions to stay litigation pending the 
outcome of reexamination are being granted more than 60% of the time overall); see also Smith, 
supra note 79, at 1 (finding that certain districts are granting such motions about 85% of the 
time). 
139  When deciding whether to grant or deny a request, “[i]f the examiner believes that 
additional prior art patents and publications can be readily obtained by searching to supply any 
deficiencies in the prior art cited in the request, the examiner can perform such an additional 
search.”  MPEP, supra note 129, § 2244, at 2200-61.  Note that this directive does not refer to 
prior art with which the examiner is already familiar, but art which he must make a new effort to 
find.  Thus, so-called “deficient” prior art submitted by the requester—which would otherwise 
result in a denial of the request—may be subject to combination with prior art found at the 
initiative of examiners.  It can be wondered to what extent this directive may make an examiner 
 




and Smith, saw early that “in a very real sense, once reexamination is ordered (an 
unreviewable decision), the patent holder ‘starts over’ under the PTO view on all § 102 
and § 103 issues with respect to all claims, amended or unamended, whether or not 
related to the new question.”140  And it has been observed that “[r]eexamination is . . . 
tantamount to a patent challenger collaborating with the PTO to invalidate the patent.”141  
Therefore, third parties have strong incentives to take liberties with their reexamination 
requests in order to ensure that the PTO determines that an SNQ has been raised and thus 
orders the reexamination to proceed.142  Indeed, almost all of the allegations of 
misconduct explored herein relate to information that was misrepresented to, or withheld 
from, the PTO in the third party’s request.143
 A member of the Assistant Commissioner’s staff admitted soon after the 
reexamination statutes became law that “[t]he meaning and scope of the term ‘a 
substantial new question of patentability’ is not defined in the statute and must be 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
the ally of the requester, and whether it serves to tilt the balance too far in favor of granting 
requests.  Once a request is granted and reexamination is under way, examiners are instructed to 
search for additional prior art.  See MPEP, supra note 129, § 2256, at 2200-87 (“[T]he examiner 
must also consider patents and printed publications . . . discovered by the examiner in searching . 
. . .”). 
140  Etter, 756 F.2d at 863, 865 (Nies, Smith, & Bissell, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he [PTO] 
Commissioner . . . should not merely allow reexamination to proceed in any direction at the 
discretion of an examiner.  Clearly, reexamination was not designed to allow the PTO simply to 
reconsider and second guess what it has already done.”).  Reexamination permits the PTO to 
“start over” with respect to a few other issues as well.  For example, a divided Federal Circuit 
panel in Lonardo held that the PTO is authorized to consider questions of “double patenting” 
during reexamination, engaging in what Janis has called “a considerable feat of statutory 
interpretation” in order to reach this conclusion.  Janis, supra note 61, at 53 n.229. 
141  Allen M. Leung, Legal Judo: Strategic Applications of Reexamination Versus an 
Aggressive Adversary (Part I), 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 471, 486 (2002). 
142  Cf. Speranza and Goldman, supra note 58, at 302 (“Another advantage of reexamination 
to the patent challenger is the opportunity, as the initiator of the reexamination request, to have 
the first word regarding the scope of claims and applicability of prior art.”). 
143  In ex parte reexamination proceedings, the third-party requester’s participation is limited 
to the submission of his request; thus, it is not surprising that the request would be the site of 
misconduct.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.550 (2010).  However, if and when a patent owner decides to file 
an initial statement under 37 C.F.R. § 1.530 after the reexamination has been ordered but before 
the PTO has issued a first office action, the requester is afforded a chance to reply.  See 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.550(g).  The patent owner’s statement is rarely used and thus most requesters’ participation 
ends with the submission of the request.  See Sterne et al., supra note 58, at 41; see also 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.535 (2010).  This does not, however, prevent requesters from filing requests for 
reexamination ad infinitum, as will be discussed. 




developed to some extent on a case-by-case basis.”144  However, with the number of 
reexamination requests being granted reaching close to 94%,145 the SNQ threshold was 
soon seen by scholars and members of the patent bar as too nebulous and vulnerable to 
abuse to achieve its stated objective in practice.  It was observed that although “the 
substantial new question requirement makes sense conceptually, experience has 
demonstrated that the requirement operates suboptimally as an anti-harassment measure . 
. . is too amorphous and, as a result, is applied overinclusively.”146  One commentator has 
suggested that the SNQ threshold does so little to weed out “non-meritorious requests” 
that “today [these] are almost automatically granted.”147  Another has simply called the 
requirement “pointless.”148  It has even been speculated by one patent attorney that “since 
the PTO arguably stands to gain if a positive determination [i.e., a determination to grant 
the request] is made because otherwise it would not be able to charge a large 
reexamination fee, such an initial burden may be merely a formality in practice.”149
                                                     
144  R. Franklin Burnett, The “Nuts and Bolts” of Patent Reexamination, 9 Am. Intell. Prop. 
L. Ass’n Q.J 183, 192 (1981); see also Conger, supra note 53, at 537 n.74 (“[N]either the statute 
nor its legislative history clarify the meaning of the phrase.”). 
  
Some of the most recent criticism of the SNQ threshold has arisen as part of the current 
debate over patent reform; Senator Jon Kyl voiced his reservations concerning the 
retention of the SNQ threshold in the proposed “post-grant opposition” procedure now 
145  See USPTO Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2009, supra note 38, 
at 1244.  This rate has been fairly stable historically, as the PTO’s statistics reveal that 92% of all 
requests have been granted since 1981.  See Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data, supra note 83. 
146  See Janis, supra note 61, at 47. 
147  Maghame, supra note 19. 
148  Harold C. Wegner, Patent Harmonization, § 2182 (1993). 
149  Qin Shi, Reexamination, Opposition, or Litigation? Legislative Efforts to Create a Post-
Grant Patent Quality Control System, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 433, 449 n.61 (2003).  The same argument 
appeared at the district level in Patlex, where the plaintiff argued that that the reexamination fee 
structure violated the Due Process Clause “in much the same manner as when a portion of fines 
assessed by a court is funneled back to the judge as compensation” and that “the fee structure 
offers PTO examiners ‘a possible temptation . . . to forget the burden of proof required’ for 
ordering reexamination.”  Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 585 F. Supp. 713, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1983), 
vacated in part, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985), remanded to 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
Notwithstanding these arguments, it is probably more likely that the costs of reexamination borne 
by the PTO significantly exceed the current fee; under 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c), the current fee for 
requesting ex parte reexamination is $2,520.00, and the fee for requesting inter partes 
reexamination is $8,800.00.  As I argue below, the high grant rate has more to do with a 
combination of factors: a possible institutional bias toward revisiting patent validity, prompted by 
criticism of the Office; inadequate guidance from the Federal Circuit regarding the bounds of the 
SNQ; and a tendency by some requesters to stretch and, in a few cases, to misrepresent, the 
pertinence of prior art. 




under consideration: “One fundamental flaw in the House post-grant language is that it 
keeps a very low threshold for initiating ex parte reexam proceedings . . . This low 
threshold not only overwhelms the PTO with cases, it is also fundamentally unfair to 
patent owners . . . .”150
 During the years when reexamination initially came into use, the PTO’s stated 
policy was to err in favor of granting requests for reexamination when making its 
determination as to the presence of an SNQ.
 
151  The Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (hereinafter “MPEP”) directed PTO examiners that “any question as to 
whether a substantial new question of patentability exists should be resolved in favor of 
granting the request for reexamination.”152  This policy was explicitly overturned by the 
Federal Circuit, which stated that “when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 303 for the 
purpose of protecting the patentee, it could not have intended an implementation that 
would negate this protection.  We can not [sic] endorse such a diversion of the statutory 
purpose.”153  The PTO subsequently deleted the policy from the MPEP.154
 Nevertheless, one scholar finds that “the ruling seems to have had little practical 
effect,” since “[e]xaminers still routinely rubber-stamp requests for reexamination and 
are authorized merely to parrot back the requester’s language as support for the 
proposition that a substantial new question of patentability exists.”
 
155  While statistics for 
the year immediately following Patlex II could not be located, the fact that the PTO was 
granting 84% of requests prior to the ruling,156
 Indeed, although the language concerning the PTO’s “rule of doubt” was removed 
from the MPEP, subsequent editions have persisted to this day in advising that “in a 
simple case the examiner may adopt the reasons provided by the requester in the 
 coupled with the reality that this rate has 
only increased in the years hence, suggests the ruling has had no practical effect at all on 
the PTO’s application of the SNQ standard. 
                                                     
150  See Remarks of Senator Jon Kyl, supra note 36. 
151  Janis, supra note 61, at 48 n.207. 
152  U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure § 2244, at 582 (4th ed., rev. 7, July 1981) (containing the earliest appearance of this 
language).   
153  Patlex II, 771 F.2d 480, 487 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
154  See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure § 2244, at 2200-31 (5th ed., rev. 4, Oct. 1986) (containing the first deletion 
of the language, which was replaced by a quotation from the Patlex II decision).   
155  Janis, supra note 61, at 48. 
156  See Gregor N. Neff, Patent Reexamination—Valuable, but Flawed: Recommendations for 
Change, 68 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 575, 593 (1986). 




discussion of the substantial new question of patentability,”157 lending credence to those 
who opine that “the PTO has a tendency to accept uncritically all facts set forth in the 
request as true.”158  Veteran patent practitioners have observed that the PTO “often 
rejects all of the claims in the first OA [office action] and puts the burden on the patent 
owner to prove the patentability of the claims even if the claims have been subject to 
extensive prior art attack in prior court actions.”159  An informal study of 5000 
reexamination proceedings found that 83% of the time, the PTO’s first ruling on the 
merits was a rejection of the patent’s claims.160
 So-called “old art,” i.e., “prior art previously considered by the PTO in relation to 
the same or broader claims,”
 
161 was inadmissible162 in reexamination proceedings until 
2002, when Congress changed the law to expand the range of prior art that might raise an 
SNQ.  35 U.S.C. § 303(a) was amended explicitly to “overturn[] the holding of In re 
Portola Packaging Inc., a 1997 Federal court decision imposing an overly-strict limit that 
reache[d] beyond the text of the Patent Act.”163  Instead, Congress explained, “the 
appropriate test to determine whether a ‘substantial new question of patentability’ exists 
should not merely look at the number of references or whether they were previously 
considered or cited but their combination in the appropriate context of a new light as it 
bears on the question of the validity of the patent,” noting however that “this bill is not a 
license to abuse patentees and waste the life of the patent.”164
                                                     
157  MPEP, supra note 129, § 2246, at 2200-62. 
  Congress explicitly 
158  Janis, supra note 61, at 48 n.209.  Further, Janis believes that “anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the practice extends beyond simple cases, whatever ‘simple’ might mean.”  Id. 
159  Sterne et al., supra note 58, at 25; see also Network Appliance, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, 
Inc., No. C-07-06053, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107840, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2008) (“[T]he 
PTO almost always grants initial rejections . . . against all claims.  Thus, the Court gets only 
limited guidance from initial actions as to the ultimate outcome.  Indeed, denials, which are the 
exception, may shed more light than grants, which are the rule.”) (citation omitted) (discussing an 
early draft of Sterne et al.). 
160  See Dennis Crouch, Microsoft v. i4i: Relevance of the Pending Reexamination, Patently-
O, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/08/microsoft-v-i4i-relevance-of-the-
pending-reexamination.html. 
161  In re Portola Packaging, 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
162  See Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & 
Ent. L.J. 481, 488 n.29 (2000).  Janis has, however, noted that the “PTO . . . staunchly resisted the 
approach laid out” in Portola and the cases that followed it, “reading them extremely narrowly.”  
Id.  This perhaps reflects the PTO’s institutional resistance to anything that might narrow its 
latitude for correcting erroneously granted patents. 
163  H.R. Rep. No. 107-120, at 2 (2002). 
164  Id. at 3. 




distinguished “the safety-valve of a ‘substantial new question of patentability’ standard” 
from “merely ‘any sort of question’” and exhorted the courts to “judiciously interpret the 
‘substantial new question’ standard to prevent cases of abusive tactics and harassment of 
patentees through reexamination.”165  However, the most recent case to reevaluate the 
scope of the SNQ threshold, In re Swanson, provided scant guidance as to what 
constitutes “new light” on old art, as distinguished from repetitive submission of old 
art.166
 Because third parties know that the USPTO routinely grants reexamination for 
approximately 94% of the requests it receives if they at least appear to comply with the 
requirements for such requests, there is little reason to imagine that the process is safe 
from fraud and manipulation.  Nor can it be naively assumed that the 5-6% of requests 
that are denied constitute the bulk of the “bad apples.”  It is possible that many, if not 
most, of those requests are denied for merely technical reasons.  The PTO’s form PTOL-
2077 “Notice of Failure to Comply with Ex Parte Reexamination Request Filing 
Requirements (37 CFR 1.510(c))” lists a few possible reasons, including: failure to pay 
the reexamination filing fee; failure to identify the patent, or the specific claims thereof, 
for which reexamination is requested; failure to properly cite the patents and printed 
publications that are presented to raise an SNQ; failure to include a statement pointing 
out each SNQ and explaining the relevance of the prior art; submitting illegible copies of 
the prior art; and failure to certify that the requester has served a copy of the request on 
the patent owner. 
   
167
                                                     
165  Id. at 3. 
  The PTO typically gives the requester 30 days to correct these 
oversights, after which the request is presumably rejected.  However, it is uncertain 
whether (and what proportion of) requests are denied due to formal inadequacies or 
because the PTO actually finds that they do not raise an SNQ, because the PTO does not 
166  In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that “the 2002 amendment 
removes the focus of the new question inquiry from whether the reference was previously 
considered, and returns it to whether the particular question of patentability presented . . . was 
previously evaluated by the PTO”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 107-120, at 3).  One sign of the court’s 
concern with this issue is that, during oral arguments, Judge Alan D. Lourie asked counsel for the 
PTO: “When is there not a substantial new question of patentability? . . . If a reference is cited 
which was never cited before, obviously there’s a question of new question of patentability.  Now, 
if the reference was previously cited, there’s still a new question of patentability.  When is there 
not a new question of patentability under the law today?”  PTO Associate Solicitor Mary Kelly 
replied: “I would say, when the reference was cited for substantially the same reason that’s being 
raised by the Director or by a third party as it was in the original prosecution.”  Digital Recording 
of Oral Arguments, In re Swanson (emphasis added), available at  
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/Audiomp3/2007-1534.mp3.  Judge Lourie’s statement 
regarding newly cited references should not, of course, be taken to imply his belief that every new 
reference would, as such, raise a substantial new question of patentability, only that it could raise 
it. 
167  See MPEP, supra note 129, § 2227, at 2200-43-44 (referring to use of Form PTOL-
2077); see also 37 C.F.R. §1.510 (2010). 




break down its statistics by reason for denial. 
 The manner in which the PTO has applied the SNQ threshold168 is deficient in 
several respects, prompting one practitioner to conclude that the materiality standard 
adopted by the PTO is “de minimus [sic], enabling virtually all cited references to 
establish” the existence of an SNQ.169  Unfortunately, this has had the effect of 
encouraging third parties to take advantage of the reexamination process in a manner not 
wholly consistent with their duty of candor to the PTO.170  For instance, although the 
Federal Circuit has held that prior art merely “cumulative with any old art” is “not 
sufficient to create” an SNQ,171 nowhere does the MPEP direct examiners to review the 
prior art of record to determine whether the prior art cited by the requester is merely 
cumulative.  Instead, the Office has evidently relied on requesters to comply with its 
suggestion that “the request should point out how any questions of patentability raised are 
substantially different from those raised in the earlier prosecution of the patent before the 
Office or in litigation before the federal courts,”172
                                                     
168  The extremely high rate at which the PTO is granting requests for reexamination is 
troubling and suggests that institutional bias toward reviewing issued patents may be one factor in 
its decisions.  This inclination, if real, may be the effect of pressure on the Office from press 
stories critical of a few reputedly questionable patents issued in recent years.  The results of this 
bias, however it may have been effectuated, remind us disquietingly of the treatment of patents 
during a certain period within the 8th Circuit—suggesting that many patents are being subjected 
to a lengthy scrutiny at the PTO which they do not merit.  As Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa has 
recalled: “I can remember the days in pre-1982.  If you had a patent case which arose in the 8th 
Circuit, and you were the patentee, you may as well just give it up, because the 8th Circuit did not 
find a valid patent from 1917 to 1982.  Not one patent was valid.  And I’m sure if Shockley had 
come up with the transistor patent at that point and tried it in the 8th Circuit, his patent would 
have been invalid too.”  Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa, Remarks at The Fifth Annual Hot Topics in 
Intellectual Property Law Symposium at Duke University Law School (February 17, 2006), 
available at http://realserver.law.duke.edu/ramgen/spring06/students/02172006key.rm. 
 though it is uncertain how often this 
has actually been done.  Only in the most recent revision of the MPEP does the 
suggestion seem to have become a requirement, now stating that “the request must point 
169  Conger, supra note 53, at 537 n.74. 
170  See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.555, 10.23 (2010); see also Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 967 F.2d 1440, 
1447 (“We hold that the duty of candor and good faith in the reexamination proceeding applies to 
both the requester and the patent defender, as well as to their respective attorneys and agents.”). 
171  In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 
1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
172  MPEP, supra note 151, § 2216, at 586 (emphasis added).  The suggestion has existed 
since the first revision of the MPEP to reflect the passage of reexamination procedures into law.  
Id. 





 The MPEP does mention the possibility that “where the examiner finds the 
additional (newly provided) prior art patents or printed publications are merely 
cumulative,”
 the differences from previous questions of patentability.  Of course, there is 
reason to doubt that this requirement is being regularly complied with in practice. 
174 an SNQ may not be raised.  However, examiners are never explicitly 
directed to make this finding by, for instance, reviewing the file history of the patent, 
rereading the previously considered prior art, and comparing it to the prior art proffered 
by the third party requester.  Surely these things would be prerequisites to a finding 
regarding whether the prior art submitted by a third party requester is merely cumulative.  
Yet in view of the significant disjunction between the statutory three-month 
determination period, and the several-years-long pendencies of entire reexamination 
proceedings, it can easily be guessed whether examiners are presently capable of 
reviewing all the prior art of record before they make their determination as to whether 
the request raises an SNQ.  The extremely high rate at which requests are granted—to say 
nothing of specific allegations that requesters are misrepresenting prior art that is in fact 
merely cumulative175—suggests that the PTO is not adequately weeding out requests 
based on cumulative prior art.176
 Likewise, the Federal Circuit has stated that when “old art” is submitted by the 
requester, “the PTO should evaluate the context in which the reference was previously 
  Further admonishment from the Federal Circuit, along 
the lines of that proffered when the court disapproved the PTO’s “rule of doubt” in 
Patlex, may be necessary before the PTO will take adequate measures to screen for 
cumulative prior art. 
                                                     
173  MPEP, supra note 129, § 2216, at 2200-27 (emphasis added).  The revision also added 
the following new language: “It is not sufficient that a request for reexamination merely proposes 
one or more rejections of a patent claim or claims as a basis for reexamination.  It must first be 
demonstrated that a patent or printed publication that is relied upon in a proposed rejection 
presents a new, non-cumulative technological teaching that was not previously considered and 
discussed on the record during the prosecution of the application that resulted in the patent for 
which reexamination is requested, and during the prosecution of any other prior proceeding 
involving the patent for which reexamination is requested.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The new 
language is a step in the right direction, but it remains to be seen whether it will have any impact, 
and whether, given time constraints, examiners are in practice sufficiently empowered by the 
MPEP to enforce it. 
174  Id. at 2200-57. 
175  See Complaint at 19-22, Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 
09-CV-5157 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (alleging that “defendants knew or should have known that 
the references they submitted were merely cumulative to the closest prior art of record”). 
176  Cf. 71 Fed. Reg., supra note 133.  The PTO’s proposal to help “the Office to be better 
able to weed out those requests that do not raise a substantial question of patentability, prior to 
instituting a full-blown proceeding,” is an implicit admission that the PTO is having difficulty in 
preventing full-blown proceedings from being instituted, despite the fact that the requests did not 
in fact raise an SNQ. 




considered and the scope of the prior consideration and determine whether the reference 
is now being considered for a substantially different purpose.”177  Surely all this will 
necessarily “require an analysis of the record of the prior proceedings to determine if and 
how the examiner used the reference in making his initial decisions.”178  Yet the MPEP 
directs examiners to do no more than “check the patent’s file history to ascertain whether 
the art that will provide the basis for the rejection was previously cited/considered in an 
earlier concluded Office examination of the patent”179—a task that presumably requires 
no more than that the examiner glance at the face of the patent or previous reexamination 
certificate.  The MPEP then explains that an SNQ “may be based solely on old art where 
the old art is being presented/viewed in a new light,”180 giving examiners no direction 
whatsoever as to what such ‘new light’ may mean.  One could have wished that the 
Federal Circuit had done more in In re Swanson to provide such guidance itself.  But with 
respect to finding an SNQ based on old art, the PTO must bear some blame for having 
adopted a practice similar to the “rule of doubt” that was found to be a “diversion of 
statutory purpose.”181  Congress explicitly distinguished the SNQ, after all, from “merely 
any sort of question.”182
 In sum, there are strong reasons to suspect that the SNQ standard is not 
functioning to fulfill its intended purpose of preventing unwarranted reexaminations.  The 
PTO’s application of that standard is disquieting and partly to blame
 
183 for the 
unwarranted reexaminations that do occur,184 but it is also understandable in view of the 
PTO’s notoriously strained budget.  And there are signs that the Office is both aware of 
and interested in doing what it can to address the problem.185
                                                     
177  In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
  Likewise, the Federal 
178  Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1380-81. 
179  MPEP, supra note 129, § 2258, at 2200-58, 2200-59 (emphasis added). 
180  Id. at 2200-59. 
181  Patlex II, 771 F.2d 480, 487 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
182  H.R. Rep. No. 107-120, at 2 (2002). 
183  During a talk he gave while Deputy General Counsel for Intellectual Property Law and 
Solicitor at the PTO, John Whealan asked the audience: “How many of you have ever filed a 
reexam?  Are you scared to file reexam?  Yeah, you should’ve been.  We weren’t doing as good a 
job as we should’ve been.”  John Whealan, Lecture at Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law: The Role of the Solicitor’s Office in Shaping Patent Policy (Feb. 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=769AKS2r0Is. 
184  See Logan, supra note 28, at 997 (recommending that the SNQ standard “be rigorously 
enforced, and not just a ‘rubber-stamp’ approval”). 
185  See 71 Fed. Reg., supra note 133. 




Circuit’s interpretation to date has neither made the SNQ standard sufficiently 
meaningful,186 nor given PTO examiners enough guidance to know when an SNQ is or is 
not raised.  If future cases are brought which, like Lockwood, would require the plaintiff 
to prove “that the USPTO would not have granted reexamination but for [requester]’s 
misrepresentations” and thus “whether the prior art references, properly characterized, 
meet the standard for reexamination under the patent laws”187 these may force the 
Federal Circuit to confront what the SNQ standard means and what it does not.  To begin 
with, courts struggling with this standard would benefit from revisiting the Congressional 
Record, where the SNQ was said to be equivalent to a “creditable case of invalidity.”188  
This may serve to clear up confusion (whether willful or inadvertent) among practitioners 
who assert that a “‘prima facie’ case of unpatentability need not exist for there to be a 
substantial new question of patentability.”189
 I now turn briefly to the burdens specific to the reexamination process, to give 
some notion of what patent holders must face when subjected to these proceedings 
unfairly. 
 
B. Burdens of the Process 
 Since reexamination is required to be conducted with “special dispatch,” a patent-
holder is held to a higher standard than he would be during other PTO proceedings, and if 
he is unintentionally late in responding to a PTO office action during reexamination, he is 
at great risk that the proceeding will be terminated and his claims will be cancelled.190
                                                     
186  See Oliver, supra note 50, at 1097 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has struggled throughout the 
1990’s to provide guidance regarding these issues.”). 
  
187  Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220, 228 (Ct. App. 
2009). 
188  Statement of PTO Commissioner Sidney Diamond, Industrial Innovation & Patent & 
Copyright Law Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 6933, 6934, 3806, & 214 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 581 (1980). 
189  Brief of O’Melveny & Myers LLP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees 
at 20, Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 2010-1189 (Fed. Cir., 
docketed Feb. 17, 2010).  The brief cites Etter for the proposition quoted above, but Etter merely 
says that the requester need not resolve the validity issue in order to raise the SNQ.  See In re 
Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
190  See In re Katrapat, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d, 1863, 1866-67 (Comm’r Pat. & Trademarks 1988) 
(“Had Congress intended to additionally permit revival of unintentionally terminated 
reexamination proceedings, it could have demonstrated such intent . . . but it did not do so . . . .  
[P]ermitting revival of unintentionally terminated reexamination proceedings . . . would be 
inconsistent with the statutory requirement for ‘special dispatch’ in the conduct of reexamination 
proceedings.”); see also In re Egbers, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1869, 1871 (Comm’r Pat. & Trademarks 
 




One scholar has noted that rules of reexamination “leave open the possibility that the 
patentee will be burdened by voluminous and/or complex documentary prior art 
advanced by the reexamination requester.”191  Moreover, by forcing the patent-holder to 
defend the validity of his patent, the requester forces him to make numerous statements 
about his claims which may later be used against him in court, for example in order “to 
rebut infringement claims through prosecution history estoppel.”192
 But the difficulties for patent holders who find themselves in reexamination are 
further amplified by several procedural differences between reexamination and district 
court adjudication of validity.  First, the statutory presumption of validity that applies to a 
patent in court is cast aside in reexamination.
 
193  This presents the requester, as Judge 
Nies noted rather prophetically, with “the obvious strategy . . . [of] forc[ing] the patentee 
back to the PTO where the patentee’s presumptive advantage, as well as claim 
construction advantage, is eliminated.”194  In the words of one practitioner, reexamination 
allows requesters “to make an end run around the presumption of validity.”195  Second, 
whereas a party asserting the invalidity of a patent in court “must support the assertion by 
facts constituting clear and convincing evidence,”196 the PTO may make rejections under 
“a preponderance of evidence,” a “standard of proof . . . [which] is substantially lower 
than in a civil case.”197
                                                                                                                                                              
1988) (“A terminated reexamination proceeding may be revived for ‘unavoidable’ delay under 
35§ U.S.C. 305 and 133, but not for ‘unintentional’ delay under § 41(a) (7).”). 
  Third, in district courts patent claims are “so construed, if 
191  Janis, supra note 61, at 57. 
192  Amy J. Tindell, Final Adjudication of Patent Validity in PTO Reexamination and Article 
III Courts: Whose Job Is It Anyway?, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 787, 793 (2007). 
193  See Etter, 756 F.2d at 864 (reasoning that the patent holder may amend his claims in 
reexamination, but may not do so in court). 
194  Id. at 862; see also Leung, supra note 140, at 483-84 (characterizing the differences in 
reexamination as “procedural advantages for a third-party requester” and suggesting that 
“reexamination should be a more preferable forum for challengers”). 
195  Conger, supra note 53, at 541. 
196  In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
197  In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Caveney, 761 F.2d at 674).  
The majority opinion of Etter distinguished the role of the PTO during reexamination from that of 
a litigant asserting invalidity by saying that “the examiner is not attacking the validity of the 
patent but is conducting a subjective examination of the claims in light of prior art.”  Etter, 756 
F.2d at 857-58.  While it may be true that the PTO does not have  the “stake” in showing 
invalidity that a defendant accused of infringement has, it is troubling that practitioners are 
registering the tendency of the PTO to “often reject[] all of the claims in the first OA [office 
action]”,  thereby shifting the burden to the patent-holder to prove his patent’s validity.  Sterne et 
al., supra note 58, at 25.  One would hope that the outcome of such subjective examination would 
not be routinely unfavorable to the patent-holder, as this tendency suggests it now is. 




possible, as to sustain their validity”198 and are often given a “more limited 
construction”199—one which is less vulnerable to findings of anticipation or obviousness.  
By contrast, in reexamination a patent’s claims are given “their broadest reasonable 
interpretation”200 (hereinafter “BRI”) and are thus more vulnerable to being found 
anticipated by, or obvious in view of, the prior art.201  As noted by Judge Nies, this raises 
the possibility that a patent holder’s “claims may be valid and infringed in court but 
invalid in the PTO and, a fortiori, not infringed.”202  And “arguably,” as practitioners 
have suggested, the broader standard creates “a different intellectual property right.”203
 These differences from the district court setting have yielded the perception 
within the patent bar “that broader claim construction used by the PTO, combined with 
the lack of any presumption of validity [and dearth of] skilled decision makers, results in 
far easier prior art validity challenges” in reexamination.
  
When the BRI standard is applied to the determination stage of reexamination 
proceedings, it functions to widen the field of potential prior art that may be deemed to 
raise an SNQ and, rather perversely, subjects patents to extended validity challenges at 
the PTO that they might more easily and more expeditiously have traversed in the courts. 
204  Moreover, the recent 
restatement of the standard under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for determining whether a patent is 
“obvious” in view of prior art, articulated by the Supreme Court in KSR International Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc.205 has arguably extended still further the field of prior art that could give 
rise to an SNQ and prompt reexamination proceedings.206
                                                     
198  ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 
199  Id. 
200  In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir 1984).  This standard was found 
appropriate to reexamination, just as to examination and reissue proceedings, because the patent 
holder in reexamination has the opportunity to amend his claims that he would not have in district 
court.  Id. 
201  See Leung, supra note 140, at 486 (noting that the BRI standard for the “interpretation of 
claims would also favor a patent challenger in reexamination”). 
202  Etter, 756 F.2d at 862. 
203  Sterne et al., supra note 58, at 24. 
204  Sterne et al., supra note 58, at 25.  For a scholarly critique of the BRI standard, see 
Dawn-Marie Bey and Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent Office’s 
“Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J., 285 (2009). 
205  550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
206  The PTO, perhaps seeking to quell such apprehensions, has explicitly stated that KSR 
“does not alter the legal standard for determining whether a substantial new question of 
patentability exists . . . [and] [t]hus, a reexamination request relying on previously applied prior 
art that asks the Office to look at the art again based solely on the Supreme Court’s clarification 
 




 The PTO may be said to hold all the cards in that it can force patent holders to 
waste valuable patent life in appealing potentially unreasonable grounds for rejection; 
there is thus a significant incentive for patent holders to accede to an examiner’s 
interpretation of the prior art in later stages of the proceeding.207  Because during 
reexamination the clock is running on the patent term with no prospect of extension, in 
some cases patent holders may choose to make claim amendments which they see as 
insubstantial in order to hasten the conclusion of the proceeding,208 even though they 
might have avoided such amendments and won on the merits had they been willing to 
spend the additional time required to appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (hereinafter “BPAI”) and then the Federal Circuit.209
 Approximately 25% of patents have emerged from reexamination with the 
validity of all claims confirmed,
  Of course, as a result, 
patent holders relinquish the ability to pursue past damages to which they might have 
been entitled if they had not been compelled to amend their claims.   
210 or about 1,705 patents based on the most recent 
statistics.211
                                                                                                                                                              
of the legal standard for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 in KSR, without presenting 
the art in new light or different way, will not raise a substantial new question of patentability as to 
the patent claims, and reexamination will not be ordered.”  MPEP, supra note 129, § 2216, at 
2200-27, 2200-28.  Yet given the uncertainty as to what such “new light” consists of, and the 
absence of guidance in In re Swanson, it remains to be seen what use of KSR will be made by 
requesters and examiners. 
  It is difficult to ascertain how many of these reexaminations involved “close 
calls” concerning validity, but from the difficulties discussed, one can surmise that a fair 
207  See McCook Metals L.L.C. v. Alcoa, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 242, 262 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“In both 
the appeal process and the reexamination proceedings, the patent applicant or holder is in a 
defensive position and in an adversarial relationship to the examiner.”). 
208  See Sterne et al., supra note 58, at 24 (“A patent owner may be forced due to these 
different claim construction standards into the difficult circumstance of amended claims to 
incorporate the court’s construction and potentially lose past damages or continue to argue the 
issue in the reexamination proceeding and potentially extinguish all intellectual property rights in 
the patent.  Several patent owners have faced this exact situation.”). 
209  The most recent statistics give the average time to decision on appeal to the BPAI as 6-7 
months. See Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences Performance Measures, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/perform/fy2009b.pdf.  A third party requester 
is not permitted to participate in any appeals of an ex parte reexamination to the BPAI.  See 
MPEP, supra note 129, § 2273, at 2200-130 (“A third party requester may not appeal, and may 
not participate in the patent owner’s appeal.”).  However, in certain cases the Federal Circuit has 
allowed third parties to intervene in court appeals.  See, e.g., In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 862 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (“The record in this case shows that an alleged infringer in litigation forced the 
reexamination . . . and was permitted to intervene and brief matters in this court.”); see also 
MPEP, supra note 129, § 2279, at 2200-134. 
210  See Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data, supra note 83. 
211  Id. 




number of the patents involved may have been subjected to needless review.  Nor does 
this statistic adequately convey how many patents’ validity was actually confirmed in 
reexamination, since the PTO tends to count even typographical corrections to claim 
language as if they were substantive amendments to the claims, perhaps in an effort to 
show that the reexamination process is merited or “working” more often than it actually 
is.212  Thus, at least a small number of the 65% of patents that have emerged from 
reexamination with “amended”213 claims can likely be counted among the former group 
of valid patents.  Only 11% of patents to have undergone reexamination have been 
wholly invalidated.214
 One recent study has presented the mean cost of an ex parte reexamination as 
being $12,974
 
215 but this appears to be only for the preparation of a request,216 rather than 
for the entire proceeding.  Other evidence suggests that the legal fees associated with 
defending reexamination proceedings are, in certain cases, nearer the range of 
$100,000217 or even “hundreds of thousands of dollars.”218
                                                     
212  See Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate at 2, Ex Parte 
Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,289,319, Control No. 90/006,623 (Apr. 23, 2007).  In this 
case, the PTO confirmed the patentability of claim 1 but referred to the claim as “amended” 
merely because the patent owner corrected a spelling error (namely, adding the letter “i” to 
change “inquires” to read “inquiries”), which the PTO itself had made when the patent was 
originally issued.  The PTO refused the patent owner’s request to change the status of the claim 
from “amended” to “confirmed,” though it noted that “the merit and enforcing rights of the patent 
owner are neither denied nor reduced in any manner, form or substance” by the correction.  Id. 
  In any event, it is unknown 
how many patent holders are forced to default as a result of the burdensome legal fees 
213  See Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data, supra note 83. 
214  Id. 
215  Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey I-82, chart Q33m 
(2007). 
216  This may not even give an accurate sense of the range of costs incurred by requesters in 
preparing requests.  For example, in the Ecast malpractice case, the plaintiff claimed that its law 
firm had advised it that the “estimated cost of [preparing a reexamination request would] be 
approximately $100,000.00 per patent.”  See Complaint at 7, Ecast Inc. v. Morrison & Foerster 
LLP, No. CGC-09-487063 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 8, 2009).  This was represented as relatively 
cheap compared to the $4.8 million in attorney’s fees Ecast incurred in having to defend the 
patent litigation allegedly as a result of its law firm’s failure to file requests for reexamination 
against the patent holder. 
217  In the Lockwood case, the plaintiff stated that his “patent attorney estimated [the 
reexamination defense] would cost $100,000.00 in legal expenses alone.”  Declaration of 
Lawrence B. Lockwood at 17, Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 09-
CV-5157 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009). 
218  See Remarks of Senator Jon Kyl, supra note 36. 




associated with defending the reexamination, with the result that their “claims [are] 
cancelled as a result of their default, even when the reexamination would not have 
presented a meritorious case,”219 but just a small number of such instances would reduce 
the 11% of cases in which the PTO cancelled all claims on putatively substantive 
grounds.220
 Because the PTO simply adopts the reasoning of requesters in its initial 
decisions,
 
221 “often reject[ing] all of the claims in the first OA [office action],”222 
preliminary rulings during the reexamination process often send the wrong signal, 
causing investors to flee a stock without reason.  For example, as mentioned above, 
Tessera Technologies’ stock dropped223 by 39% the day the third party requester issued a 
press release stating that “the Patent Office issued an Official Action rejecting Tessera’s . 
. . patent . . . [and] the Patent Office rejected every claim of the ‘627 patent that is in 
reexamination.”224  The press release failed to note, however, that the PTO’s action was 
non-final225
                                                     
219  Conger, supra note 53, at 555. 
 and, moreover, only the first such action received in the reexamination.  The 
share price did not begin to recover until Tessera’s general counsel reassured investors 
220  That Senator Kyl mentions “many” such instances is some indication that they may not 
be altogether uncommon.  See Remarks of Senator Jon Kyl, supra note 36.  Future studies in this 
area could determine the extent to which default, bankruptcy, or other financial strain is brought 
to patentees as a result of reexamination. 
221  See Janis, supra note 61, at 48. 
222  See Sterne et al., supra note 58, at 25. 
223  Id. at 4 n.10; see also Maurna Desmond, Investors Turn On Patent-Challenged Tessera, 
Forbes, Mar. 4, 2008.  By my estimate, the one-day loss represented more than $437 million in 
shareholder value. 
224  See Press Release, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Siliconware Wins Again in Its Patent 
Reexamination Fight Against Tessera, (Mar. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.orrick.com/news_events/releases.asp?action=article&articleid=6026. 
225  In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court, the PTO recognized that “the existence of such 
a [non-final] proceeding by itself implies nothing meaningful about its likely outcome” but this 
view has not improved the confidence of investors.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) 
(No. 05-130), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f215700/215790.pdf.  In fact, the 
PTO’s position raises a further question: if the existence of a reexamination proceeding implied 
nothing meaningful about its likely outcome, then how must we interpret the standard by which 
reexamination is initiated in the first place?  By logical extension, the PTO’s position implies that 
the existence of the SNQ by itself implies nothing meaningful about the outcome of a 
reexamination, i.e., it implies nothing meaningful about a patent’s validity or invalidity.  This 
absurd implication can only point to flaws in both the SNQ threshold and the PTO’s 
interpretation of it. 




and the press, explaining that “claims of a patent can not [sic] be invalidated in 
reexamination until the process is fully complete, including all appeals.”226
C. Constitutional Issues 
  While such 
examples may rightly be viewed as primarily the result of miscommunication and poorly 
managed public relations, it can hardly be questioned that such damage to shareholder 
value would be unjust in cases where the reexaminations themselves were unwarranted or 
instigated under false pretenses.  The existence of reexamination proceedings might even 
be a helpful indicator to the market if the process were more reliable—if it were 
instigated less often for harassment or if sham requests were not leading to baseless 
proceedings—but because of the vulnerability of the SNQ threshold to abuse, the loss of 
confidence in a patent’s validity is often unfounded. 
 Better understanding of the potential for fraudulent reexamination proceedings 
may prompt some to revisit several constitutional questions that were raised not long 
after the reexamination laws were instituted.  In Patlex I, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
retroactive effect of the reexamination legislation violated their right to due process under 
the Fifth Amendment,227 and that reexamination proceedings deprived them of their 
Seventh Amendment right to have validity determined by a jury228 or by an Article III 
court.229  The Federal Circuit rejected the arguments regarding the alleged Fifth 
Amendment violation, holding that “the overriding public purposes Congress articulated 
in enacting the reexamination law with retroactive effect are entitled to great weight, and 
that Congress did not act in an arbitrary and irrational way to achieve its desired 
purposes.”230  The court also rejected the Seventh Amendment and Article III arguments, 
“find[ing] no constitutional infirmity . . . in patent reexamination by the PTO” primarily 
on the grounds that patents are “public rights.”231
 However, Mark Janis has argued that “because of the tie between administrative 
patent revocation and the public rights doctrine, the Seventh Amendment impact of 
proposed reexamination reform will vary as the public rights doctrine continues to 
evolve,” and that “a more restrictive approach to the public rights doctrine could lead to 
serious questions about whether the existing reexamination scheme complies with the 
 
                                                     
226  Maurna Desmond, Tessera Up After Reassurances, Forbes, Mar. 6, 2008. 
227  Patlex I, 758 F.2d 594, 600-01 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
228  Id. at 602. 
229  Id. 
230  Id. at 603. 
231  Id. at 604. 




jury guarantee.”232  Noting Judge Nies’ dissent in In re Lockwood,233 Janis goes so far as 
to assert that “the public rights rationale has arguably been eviscerated by the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Lockwood” and that “as Judge Nies pointed out . . . although the 
Lockwood majority does not explicitly overrule Patlex I . . . [that] decision[] seem[s] 
irreconcilable with Lockwood.”234  However this may be, Janis may prove prescient in 
predicting it “inevitable” that reexamination “will spawn another . . . constitutionality 
challenge” along the lines of Patlex I.235
 A fuller appreciation of the extent to which the reexamination process is subject 
to gamesmanship and outright fraud may demand reconsideration
 
236
                                                     
232  Janis, supra note 61, at 89. 
 of even the narrower 
233  See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995), an 
important decision in which the majority held that the patent holder has a right to a jury trial on 
validity issues in declaratory judgment actions.  When defendant American Airlines’ subsequent 
petition for a writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, however, Lockwood withdrew 
his request for a jury trial, thus mooting the question in dispute.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the district court, taking the additional step however of vacating the Federal 
Circuit’s decision.  As the Federal Circuit later noted in Tegal v. Tokyo Electron, “the Supreme 
Court vacated Lockwood without explanation.  Thus, our analysis has been neither supplanted nor 
questioned.  Although no longer binding, we find its reasoning pertinent.”  Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo 
Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
234  Janis, supra note 61, at 90.  Janis goes on to observe that “[t]he approach espoused by the 
Lockwood majority could be construed to preclude Congress altogether from enacting ambitious 
schemes for administrative patent revocation” but he ultimately believes that the “better approach 
would be to reject the Lockwood majority on the basis of either the public rights doctrine…or the 
Seventh Amendment historical analysis,” owing to his view of the “futility of the historical 
analysis” and preference for “functional considerations.”  Id. at 92. 
235  Id. at 89.  While disagreeing with the majority, Judge Nies pointed out forcefully that its 
“rationale [in Lockwood] cannot explain the Patlex case which denied the patentee litigant a right 
to a jury to determine validity.  Patlex must be overruled under the panel’s reasoning.”  In re 
Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 983 (Nies, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
236  In a recent interview, Former Chief Judge Paul R. Michel stated that “I don’t share the 
idea that the court can’t lead . . . [or] can’t improve . . . In fact, I’m surprised by how seldom 
we’re asked on rehearing petitions to confront any fundamental doctrine or question any of our 
own precedents . . . .”  When asked whether he thought it was fair for litigants to challenge 
precedents directly (rather than, e.g., allege a conflict between cases), Michel replied, “Sure.  Of 
course . . . I’m surprised by how unimaginative, unaggressive, shallow most of the rehearing 
petitions are, and that very much handicaps the court.  Now on the other hand, we frequently 
lurch toward going en banc and then don’t do it, in the sense that of course it takes 7 votes out of 
the 12 active judges, and very often we get 4 or 5, and maybe 6, but getting the seventh vote to 
rehear a panel decision en banc has proved to be extremely difficult . . . .  I think that amicus brief 
writers from academia, from industries, from bar associations, etc., might be able to play a very 
important role to strengthen the case for rehearing en banc . . . .”  Interview with Former Chief 
 




constitutional issues raised in Patlex II, for example the challenge to 37 C.F.R. §1.530 on 
the grounds that, by preventing the patent holder from responding to the representations 
of the requester during the SNQ period, the statute violates his right to due process.237  
The Federal Circuit concluded “the general rule is that the demands of due process do not 
require a hearing at the initial stage . . . in an administrative patent proceeding”238 and 
that “[t]he determination that a substantial new question of patentability exists . . . lacks 
those special circumstances of irreparable harm which have characterized exceptions to 
the general rule.”239  However, from a policy perspective at least, the PTO itself has 
recognized that altering the statute to allow patent holders the right to respond would 
improve the effort to protect them from harassment.240
 Other commentators, some of them critical of the Federal Circuit’s actions in 
Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd.,
 
241 have recently raised these constitutional issues 
anew.242  In Translogic, the district court found a patent valid, imposed monetary 
damages and a permanent injunction; the BPAI, in a parallel reexamination proceeding, 
had issued a rejection of the same patent as obvious about two months after the district 
court’s decision.243  The Federal Circuit, confronted with simultaneous appeals from the 
district court and the BPAI, affirmed the BPAI’s rejection and vacated the district court 
judgment.244  While one commentator seems to have misread the posture of the 
Translogic case,245
                                                                                                                                                              
Judge Paul R. Michel (Jan., 2009), available at 
http://www.ipcolloquium.com/Programs/Media/IPC-Program4.mp3. 
 her indignation is understandable.  If a jury holds a patent valid over 
237  Patlex II, 771 F.2d 480, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
238  Id. at 485 (citing Opp. Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941)). 
239  Id. at 485. 
240  See 71 Fed. Reg., supra note 133, at 16073 (“Such a patent owner reply . . . should serve 
the purpose of reducing improper/unnecessary orders.”).  However, the PTO did not adopt the 
proposed changes, chiefly because any delay caused by the patent owner’s response would be 
inconsistent with reexamination’s statutory requirement for special dispatch. 
241  250 F. App’x 988 (Fed Cir. 2007). 
242  See Megan Keane, Patent Reexamination and the Seventh Amendment, 77 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 1101 (2009); see also Tindell, supra note 191. 
243  Translogic, 250 F. App’x 988. 
244  Id. 
245  Keane sees the implication of Translogic to be “that a jury verdict can be reversed based 
on a review of an administrative agency decision even though the agency’s decision is not yet 
final.”  Keane, supra note 241, at 1106 (emphasis added).  That would be troubling indeed, but 
the fact is that the BPAI’s decision in Translogic was final, and the Federal Circuit’s affirmance 
of the rejection of the very claims found infringed by the district court (namely, claims 16 and 17) 
 




certain prior art, there may be significant Seventh Amendment issues if the verdict were 
to be overturned as the result of a contrary PTO determination on the same prior art in 
reexamination.  Wayne Paugh has recently driven home this point as a matter of policy, 
arguing that the PTO should not “conduct[] a post-decision reexam initiated by the same 
parties using the same prior art or evidence considered by the district court”246 and that 
“the reexamination process . . . [should] function as an alternative to litigation, not a 
supplement to it.”247
D. Allegations of Abuse 
 
 I now turn in somewhat granular detail to several reexaminations in which patent 
holders complained of misrepresentation by the third party requester.  In doing so, of 
course, I do not endorse any allegation of wrongdoing against any specific parties, but 
merely reproduce what is already of public record. 
1.  Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749. 
 On August 11, 2003, Zilog, Inc. (hereinafter “Zilog”) sued Quicklogic 
Corporation (hereinafter “Quicklogic”) in the Northern District of California, alleging 
infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749 (hereinafter “the Freeman patent”248
 Seven months after the reexamination was ordered, the PTO issued its first office 
action, finding claim 3 to be patentable but rejecting claims 1 and 2 as being anticipated 
).  
Quicklogic requested its first reexamination of the ‘749 patent on November 21, 2003, 
and filed a motion to stay the litigation pending the outcome of the reexamination.  The 
request for reexamination was granted and the court accordingly stayed the litigation on 
March 31, 2004. 
                                                                                                                                                              
seems to have compelled the result in this case.  It is unclear from the record whether the district 
court, in finding the patent valid, had the opportunity to consider the prior art that formed the 
basis for the BPAI’s rejection.  If it did not, that would of course mean that the BPAI was not 
second-guessing the district court’s finding as to the same prior art, but was considering new art. 
246  Wayne B. Paugh, The Betrayal of Patent Reexamination: An Alternative to Litigation, 
Not a Supplement, 19 Fed. Cir. B.J. 177, 195 (2009). 
247  Id. at 181. 
248  Inventor Ross Freeman was recently inducted into the National Inventors Hall of Fame 
on the strength of another invention, patented as U.S. Patent No. 4,870,302.  See Press Release, 
Xilinx, Xilinx Co-Founder Ross Freeman Honored as 2009 National Inventors Hall of Fame 
Inductee for Invention of FPGA (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/1637780/xilinx_cofounder_ross_freeman_honored_as
_2009_national_inventors_hall/. 




by U.S. Patent No. 4,207,556 (hereinafter “Sugiyama”).249  In its response, Zilog alleged 
that Quicklogic had “distorted and misrepresented the disclosure of Sugiyama,” noting 
that “[a]lthough switches 41aa and 41ij in Sugiyama are depicted as identical structures 
in Figure 1 of Sugiyama” Quicklogic “has distorted the Sugiyama disclosure in an effort 
to make it look more like the patented structure in the Freeman patent.”250  Zilog referred 
to a figure labeled the “Electrical Equivalent of Sugiyama ‘556”251
 For example, Zilog noted that “in contrast to the differentiation between ‘switches 
43’ and ‘switches 41aa’ taught by Sugiyama, the Requester’s [figure] depicts [the 
switches] as identical.”
 which had been 
drawn by Quicklogic in its request, essentially contending that the figure Quicklogic 
proffered as “equivalent” was actually a misrepresentation of Sugiyama’s teaching. 
252 Further, “the Requester’s [figure] depicts [one of the switches] 
as being in the path of a row line that continues before connecting with an unlabeled 
column line, whereas in reality that row line does not continue in the path . . . .”253  
Finally, Zilog pointed out that the “row line is depicted in the Requester’s [figure] as 
being at the same level of as the unlabeled column line, whereas Sugiyama teaches that 
the row line and the column line are at different levels.”254
 Initially, the examiner does not seem to have been persuaded by Zilog’s position 
and maintained the rejection,
 
255 but when Zilog reiterated its arguments in an appeal brief 
before the BPAI,256 the examiner dropped the rejection and confirmed the validity of the 
claims, dismissing the appeal.257
 Quicklogic filed its second request for reexamination less than three weeks after 
 
                                                     
249  Non-Final Office Action, at 3, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, 
Control No. 90/006,871 (Sept. 15, 2004). 
250  Request for Reconsideration, at 3, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, 
Control No. 90/006,871 (Oct. 14, 2004). 
251  Request for Ex Parte Reexamination, at 12, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 
4,670,749, Control No. 90/006,871 (Nov. 21, 2003). 
252  Request for Reconsideration, at 6, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, 
Control No. 90/006,871 (Oct. 14, 2004) (emphasis added). 
253  Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
254  Id. (emphasis added). 
255  See Final Office Action, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, Control 
No. 90/006,871 (Feb. 28, 2005). 
256  See Appeal Brief, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, Control No. 
90/006,871 (June 15, 2005). 
257  See Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate, at 2, Ex Parte 
Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, Control No. 90/006,871 (July 24, 2006). 




the validity of the Freeman patent was confirmed in the first proceeding, this time 
submitting two Japanese patents as prior art (“Matsuo” and “Hirajima”).258  The 
examiner rejected all claims of the ‘749 patent in his first office action.259
 Zilog “respectfully object[ed] to the creation of new figures that are not disclosed 
in Matsuo, but instead have been fabricated by the Third Party Requester,” and registered 
its belief “that Requester has in this fashion misled the Patent Office” and that “as with 
the prior reexamination of this patent, the Requester has distorted the reference figures in 
an attempt to create an anticipatory reference.”
 
260  As Zilog pointed out, the PTO 
reproduced and apparently relied on two figures which Quicklogic itself created and 
represented to be “based on a combination of Figure 3 and Figure 4(a) and (4b) of 
Matsuo.”261  As with the figure purported to be equivalent to Sugiyama in the first 
reexamination, Zilog explained how Quicklogic’s “fabricated Figure A and Figure B are 
not operable with the real figures and text of Matsuo,”262 noting that the translation of 
Matsuo submitted by Quicklogic was “uncertified”263 and concluding that “the Requester 
has . . . created drawings that contradict Matsuo and would not function.”264
 Zilog noted “curious differences from the Requester’s uncertified translation of 
Hirajima,”
 
265 and its own certified translation.  It pointed out that Quicklogic translated a 
word from Hirajima as “incorporation,” that Quicklogic had added a footnote “alleging 
that the word in the original document is strange, so that the word ‘incorporation’ must 
have instead been intended,” and that Quicklogic had represented that Hirajima was 
referring to “the D-latch 600 and switching circuit 700” in the translated passage.266
                                                     
258  See Request for Ex Parte Reexamination, at 2, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent 
No. 4,670,749, Control No. 90/008,163 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
  
Zilog—pointing out that the PTO again reproduced the translation and interpretation 
259  See Non-Final Office Action in Ex Parte Reexamination, at 3, 7, Ex Parte Reexamination 
of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, Control No. 90/008,163 (Aug. 28, 2007). 
260   Request for Reconsideration, at 3-4, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 
4,670,749, Control No. 90/008,163 (Sept. 24, 2007). 
261  Id. at 5.  The PTO reproduced Quicklogic’s figures as part of its explanation of the 
rejections.  See Non-Final Office Action, at 3, 6, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 
4,670,749, Control No. 90/008,163 (Aug. 28, 2007). 
262  Request for Reconsideration, at 5, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, 
Control No. 90/008,163 (Sept. 24, 2007). 
263  Id. at 6. 
264  Id. at 7. 
265  Id. at 11 n.4. 
266  Id. at 16. 




proffered by Quicklogic—argued, however, that its own translation revealed Hirajima to 
disclose “wiring rather than incorporation” and that the “cells to be wired” were not “the 
D-latch 600 and switching circuit 700” but rather “cell 500 and cell 600.”267
 Altera, Inc., (hereinafter “Altera”), which Zilog had in the meantime sued for 
infringing the Freeman patent, filed its own request for reexamination of the Freeman 
patent, resubmitting prior art previously filed by Quicklogic (namely the Sugiyama, 
Matsuo, and Hirajima references) along with several other references (hereinafter “El-
Ziq” and “Mead-Conway”).
 
268  The PTO granted the request and soon merged the new 
proceeding with the second Quicklogic reexamination, which was still pending,269 at 
which point it issued an office action rejecting all claims of the Freeman patent.270
 In its response, Zilog stated that the “first thing that one may notice in reading the 
Requester’s explanation of El-Ziq is that the Requester’s ‘Figure 4 of El-Ziq’ does not 
look like the real Fig. 4 of El-Ziq, but is instead rotated ninety degrees . . . .  The 
Requester then enlarges a section of the rotated Fig. 4, cutting off many of the 
connections and rendering the symbols unintelligible, except for the symbols that the 
Requester inserts . . . [and] one might ask why the Requester[] feels it necessary to 
redraw the reference figure.”
 
271
 Zilog went on to explain that whereas Quicklogic had stated that “Mead-Conway 
also has not been previously considered . . . [and t]herefore . . . constitutes new prior art,” 
in fact the reference was “listed on the front page of the Reexamination Certificate” for 
the ‘871 reexamination, which had confirmed the patentability of the Freeman patent.
 
272
 “As is becoming evident,” Zilog continued, “the modus operandi of redrawing 
figures and rehashing arguments that were considered and rejected by previous 
Examiners runs throughout the Request.”
 
273
                                                     
267  Id. (emphasis added). 
  Turning to the Sugiyama patent, which had 
been submitted once again by Quicklogic, Zilog stated, “At this point one may be tired of 
268  See Request for Ex Parte Reexamination, at 4, 11-12, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. 
Patent No. 4,670,749, Control No. 90/010,118 (Mar. 7, 2008). 
269  See Decision Merging Reexamination Proceedings, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. 
Patent No. 4,670,749, Control Nos. 90/008,163, 90/010,118 (Aug. 22, 2008). 
270  See Non-Final Office Action in Ex Parte Reexamination Proceeding, at 6, 21, Ex Parte 
Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, Control Nos. 90/008,163, 90/010,118 (Oct. 28, 
2008). 
271  Request for Reconsideration, at 5, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, 
Control Nos. 90/008,163, 90/010,118 (Nov. 25, 2008). 
272  Id. at 13. 
273  Id. at 16. 




asking why the Requester[] feels it necessary to redraw the reference figures,”274 and 
Zilog repeated many of its previous arguments against Sugiyama, Matsuo and Hirajima, 
with a view to revealing that Quicklogic “hope[d] that its distorted drawings [would] 
somehow change Sugiyama to meet”275
 These arguments apparently did not convince the examiner, who issued a final 
rejection of the Freeman patent.  Although Zilog filed a notice of appeal, it failed to file 
an appeal brief and consequently the claims of the Freeman patent were canceled.
 the limitations in the claims of the Freeman 
patent. 
276
 After more than six years spent in reexamination, during which the PTO was 
remarkably unresponsive to repeated complaints of misrepresentation by the requester, 
and in view of the fact that Zilog was limited to seeking past damages, the conclusion 
was very possibly reached that the patent, although genuinely thought valid over the prior 
art, was no longer worth fighting for. 
 
2.  Reexamination of U.S. Patent 6,860,074 
 On January 24, 2005, Pergo, Inc. and Pergo (Europe) AB (hereinafter “Pergo”) 
sued Faus Group, Inc. and Industrias Auxiliares Faus S.L. (hereinafter “Faus”) in the 
Eastern District of North Carolina, alleging patent and copyright infringement.  Pergo 
amended its complaint on March 1, 2005, to add a claim for infringement of U.S. Patent 
No. 6,860,074 (hereinafter “the Stanchfield patent”).277  Pergo moved for a preliminary 
injunction against Faus on May 5, 2005, and about seven weeks later Faus’ counsel 
requested reexamination of the Stanchfield patent.278  The request was granted,279 and on 
October 20, 2005 Faus filed a motion to stay the litigation pending the outcome of the 
reexamination.280
                                                     
274  Id. at 19. 
 
275  Id. at 20. 
276  See Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate, at 2, Ex Parte 
Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 4,670,749, Control Nos. 90/008,163, 90/010,118 (Dec. 2, 
2009). 
277  Pergo, Inc. v. Faus Group, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d 515, 517 (E.D.N.C. 2005). 
278  See Request for Ex Parte Reexamination, at 1, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent 
No. 6,860,074, Control No. 90/007,603 (June 24, 2005). 
279  Order Granting Request for Ex Parte Reexamination, at 5, Ex Parte Reexamination of 
U.S. Patent No. 6,860,074, Control No. 90/007,603 (Sept. 12, 2005). 
280  Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Decision on 
Reexamination of the Pergo Utility Patents-in-Suit at 1, Pergo, Inc. v. Faus Group, Inc., 401 F. 
Supp. 2d 515 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (No. 5:05-CV-50-FL(1)). 




 At issue was the weight the court should give the reexamination proceeding in 
deciding whether to grant Pergo’s motion for a preliminary injunction.  Pergo contended 
that “Faus found it necessary to doctor the prior art in its submission to the [PTO], 
especially as to the Kornfalt and Kelly references.”281  It explained that “Kelly’s 
purported disclosure was not prior art but was a different diagram drawn by counsel for 
Faus,” and that “Faus’ arguments of unpatentability over Kelly were based on those 
redrawn drawings.”282  Likewise, it alleged that “the drawings of Kornfalt were 
arbitrarily colored by an attorney for Faus in such a manner as to purportedly depict a 
tongue and groove joint, [whereas] in fact none of the original drawings or written 
description of Kornfalt provided such a disclosure.”283
 Pergo reminded the court that although Faus’ expert had adopted those drawings 
in his declaration, the expert later testified in his deposition that “he did not know who 
created the drawing, that he had only first seen the accused FasTrim product the day 
before his deposition, and that the drawing did not accurately represent the FasTrim 
product.”
 
284  Pergo’s own expert asserted that “the figure drawn by Defendants . . . does 
not appear in the Kelly patent,” and that “[i]n this sense, Defendants are manufacturing 
prior art by redrawing the figures of the patent.”285
 Nevertheless, the court denied Pergo’s motion for a preliminary injunction and 
held that it had failed to show “a likelihood of success on the merits, on the issue of 
whether their claim of infringement as to claim 6 of the [Stanchfield] patent will survive 
the invalidity challenge raised by defendants”
 
286—chiefly because the PTO had found an 
SNQ and commenced reexamination.  The court found the existence of the reexamination 
proceeding sufficient to raise “a substantial question of validity” that precluded Pergo 
from demonstrating a likelihood of success for the purpose of prevailing on a preliminary 
injunction motion.287
                                                     
281  Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief Regarding the Effect of the Request for Reexamination of 
the ‘074 Patent at 6, Pergo, Inc. v. Faus Group, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (No. 
5:05-CV-50-FL(1)). 
  In so holding, the court seemed to take no notice of Pergo’s 
allegations regarding the manipulation of the Kornfalt and Kelly references.  Nor is it 
clear that the court adequately assessed the weight to be given the existence of a 
reexamination proceeding, after having been inaccurately informed by counsel for Faus 
282  Id. 
283  Id. 
284  Id. at 7. 
285  Second Declaration of Eugene C. Rzucildo at 3, Pergo, Inc. v. Faus Group, Inc., 401 F. 
Supp. 2d 515 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (No. 5:05-CV-50-FL(1)). 
286  Pergo, Inc. v. Faus Group, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d 515, 525 (E.D.N.C. 2005). 
287  Id. at 524. 




that “one percent of the requests [for reexamination are] granted.”288  The case was 
settled several months later.  The reexamination itself has since confirmed the validity of 
the Stanchfield patent over all the prior art submitted by the requester.289
3.  Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 5,472,444 
 
 On October 14, 2004, Acumed, LLC (hereinafter “Acumed”) sued Smith & 
Nephew, Inc. (hereinafter “Smith & Nephew”) in the District of Oregon alleging 
infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,472,444 (hereinafter “the Huebner patent”).290  The 
litigation was settled in August 2005, with Smith & Nephew agreeing to a consent order 
that admitted infringement of the patent and precluded the company from ever contesting 
the patent’s validity, except through a reexamination proceeding.291  Accordingly, Smith 
& Nephew filed a request for reexamination on February 10, 2006.292
 The PTO rejected several claims in view of a brochure (hereinafter “the Alta 
brochure”) submitted by Smith & Nephew.  However, Acumed later pointed out that 
“[w]hat the requestor fails to mention in its submission is that there is another 
contemporaneous Alta publication that it did not disclose to the Patent Office – the Alta 
‘Surgical Techniques’ manual which summarizes how the disclosed device is supposed to 
be used.  This manual makes it clear that . . . the Alta brochure used as the basis for the 
instant rejection does not teach one of skill in the art each and every element of the 
subject claims of the Acumed patent.”
 
293
 Had Smith & Nephew submitted the withheld manual, Acumed continued, it 
would have been clear that the device disclosed by the Alta brochure was intended only 
“for humeral fractures, not fractures of the humeral cortex.”
 
294
                                                     
288  Transcript of Tutorial and Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 78-79, Pergo, 
Inc. v. Faus Group, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (No. 5:05-CV-50-FL(1)). 
  Acumed speculated that 
this distinction, revealing the inapplicability of the Alta brochure to the Huebner patent, 
289  See Parte Pergo (Europe) AB at 9, Appeal 2009-001430, Control No. 90/007,603 
(B.P.A.I. Aug. 11, 2009). 
290  See Complaint, Acumed, LLC v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 04-CV-1498 (D. Or. Oct. 14, 
2004). 
291  See Consent Judgment and Order at 3-4, Acumed, LLC v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 04-
CV-1498 (D. Or. Aug. 15 2005). 
292  See Request for Ex Parte Reexamination, at 4, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent 
No. 5,472,444, Control No. 90/007,923 (Feb. 10, 2006). 
293  Response to Office Action, at 8-9, Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 5,472,444, 
Control No. 90/007,923 (Oct. 17, 2006). 
294  Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 




was “[p]erhaps . . . why Smith & Nephew chose to ignore the . . . manual” during the 
court proceedings.295
 The examiner accepted Acumed’s arguments, withdrew the rejections over the 
Alta brochure, and confirmed the patentability of all claims.
 
296
IV.  DO PATENT HOLDERS HAVE A REMEDY?  
 
A. State Tort Liability as a Remedy 
 While the tort of malicious prosecution has not been extended to quasi-judicial 
administrative proceedings in all jurisdictions, “the continually expanding role of 
administrative bodies that perform quasi-judicial functions”297 has led many to conclude, 
in the words of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, that “when a party invokes an 
administrative proceeding with malicious intent and without probable cause, that party 
should be subject to the same sanctions that would obtain if the action were brought in 
the judicial branch.”298  Extending this tort to “quasi-judicial contested administrative 
determinations or proceedings that establish legal rights, duties, or privileges,”299 serves 
to “recognize[] and protect[] their intended quasi-judicial nature without unduly enlarging 
the scope of the tort remedy.”300
 Accordingly, I argue that, without a specific federal cause of action provided to 
patent-holders by the reexamination statutes, the state law tort of malicious prosecution is 
the best alternative.  Indeed, tort actions against third party requesters were thought a 
possible remedy for unwarranted reexaminations as early as 1981.
 
301
                                                     
295  Id. at 10. 
  The tort of 
malicious prosecution allows patent-holders a remedy whereby they can make themselves 
whole from any harm suffered by a reexamination proceeding brought without probable 
cause.  At the same time, extending liability to third party requesters serves as an 
incentive for them to comply with the duty of candor, a mirror image of the incentive for 
296  See Notice of Intent to Issue Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate, at 2, Ex Parte 
Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 5,472,444, Control No. 90/007,923 (Oct. 15, 2007). 
297  Hillside Assocs. v. Stravato, 642 A.2d 664, 667 (R.I. 1994). 
298  Id. at 668-69. 
299  Id. at 669. 
300  Haynes v. Coleman, 30 So.3d 420, 428 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
301  See Handal, supra note 19, at 252 (warning requesters to “consider the liabilities that 
would arise from such acts, either by virtue of the anticompetitive provisions of the antitrust laws 
or the recourse which an injured party has under state tort law doctrines”). 




honesty furnished to patent applicants by the inequitable conduct doctrine.302
B. The Test Case: Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton 
  Tort 
liability furthers the institutional interests of the PTO by discouraging meritless 
reexamination proceedings which are a waste of PTO resources.  Yet the specific tort of 
malicious prosecution also protects the reexamination process from a “chilling effect” 
because the widely recognized “favorable termination” element of the tort would require 
that the reexamination conclude in favor of the patent holder before he could sue—thus 
shielding requesters from liability for those proceedings which truly have merit. 
1.  Lockwood-type Claims Present No Conflict with Congressional Objectives 
 As mentioned at the outset, Lockwood promised to be an important test case in 
this area,303
 It is true that permitting Lockwood-type tort claims to go forward does not in itself 
promote the uniformity of patent law, and uniformity is an important aspect of the patent 
system.
 though the Federal Circuit ultimately left for another day the question of 
whether patent holders have any recourse for the harms they suffer when current 
safeguards against unwarranted reexaminations fail.  In what follows, I consider the 
Lockwood case and offer several reasons why I believe the finding of preemption 
affirmed therein should not bar future such claims. 
304
                                                     
302  See Wasserman, supra note 15, at 11 (“The doctrine of inequitable conduct provides the 
applicant with a powerful incentive to comply with his duty of disclosure and therefore to help to 
ensure that patents issued by the PTO are of high quality.”).  Thus, similarly, the extension of tort 
liability to third-party requesters would help ensure that requests for reexamination are of high 
quality and non-frivolous. 
  Yet, since jurisdiction of such cases will remain with the federal courts, 
neither will that uniformity be significantly undermined.  For to succeed, the plaintiff in a 
Lockwood claim would have to prove that “but for [the requester’s] misrepresentations, 
the USPTO would not have granted the request for reexamination,” requiring the court 
303  The Ball case is, to my knowledge, the only other in which an aggrieved patent holder 
brought tort claims against the third-party requester.  Although the plaintiff in Ball ultimately lost, 
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obligation to correct misrepresentations to the PTO,” and that there was no “license [for third-
party requesters] to commit intentional torts.”  Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 967 F.2d 1440, 1445-47 
(10th Cir. 1992). 
304  See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) 
(emphasizing importance of “national uniformity” in patent law). 




“to determine whether the prior art raises a ‘substantial new question of patentability.’”305  
Because Lockwood-type tort claims necessarily raise these substantial questions of 
federal patent law, they will be subject to federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1338(a),306 and the uniformity of patent law will not be harmed when federal judges are 
deciding patent issues.  As even the critics of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Hunter 
Douglas v. Harmonic Design, Inc.307 have conceded, the “values of national uniformity 
will be promoted since the Federal Circuit will ultimately determine whether the federal 
patent law issue in the state law cause of action was properly decided.”308  Hunter 
Douglas, which preempts only those state law claims that fail to allege “fraud before the 
PTO or . . . bad faith in the marketplace,”309 “provides a workable rule of preemption that 
will foster uniformity while maintaining appropriate respect for local and state 
interests.”310
 While the rule articulated in Hunter Douglas was specifically directed to the 
patent holder’s conduct, I see no logic which would preclude its application to the 
requester: if there is fraud before the PTO, this may open the perpetrator to state tort 
liability, regardless of whether he perpetrated the fraud in calling into question another’s 
entitlement to a patent or in obtaining one for himself.  Lockwood-type tort claims, 
premised on sham reexamination proceedings instigated in bad faith, should escape 
preemption under an application of the Hunter Douglas rule to misconduct on the part of 
the requester.   
 
 One might fear that subjecting the reexamination process to “the shadow of 50 
States’ tort regimes”311 would result in the states dictating new standards applicable to 
the reexamination process.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has rightly preempted states from 
developing a “different state inventorship standard,” although in doing so it explicitly 
declined to preempt the underlying state cause of action.312
                                                     
305  Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220, 228 (Ct. App. 
2009). 
  By contrast, the elements of 
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307  153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, 
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Lockwood-type tort claims are already so dependent on patent law principles that there is 
little danger of state interference in patent doctrine.  The probable cause element of 
malicious prosecution, for instance, would hinge in such cases on the patent law question 
of whether a “reasonable examiner” would have found an SNQ over the prior art in the 
absence of any misrepresentations by the requester.313  Nor is the Federal Circuit’s 
“reasonable examiner standard” for finding an SNQ especially distant from the standard 
for probable cause in malicious prosecution, which boils down to whether “any 
reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable.”314
 In Lockwood, the district court held his malicious prosecution claim to be 
preempted by federal patent law,
 
315 citing Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee for the 
proposition that “[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly a field which the 
States have traditionally occupied.”316  The district court did not identify a specific 
conflicting statute, but apparently accepted Sheppard Mullin’s comparison of the PTO’s 
“regulatory scheme” to that of the FDA in Buckman, most importantly the statute by 
which the “PTO is empowered to investigate suspected fraud.”317  Certainly it was this 
statute which was the focus of attention on appeal before the Federal Circuit.  At oral 
argument, Judge Plager twice read it aloud, and opined that the FDA and PTO were 
invested with “quite parallel powers to detect and punish for fraud or 
misrepresentation.”318  Yet the PTO has on numerous occasions expressly disavowed an 
intention to police itself for fraud or inequitable conduct, preferring to leave these matters 
for the courts to decide.319
                                                     
313  Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220, 228 (Ct. App. 
2009) (citing Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 848 (Fed. Cir. 
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  For instance, in 1988 PTO Commissioner Donald Quigg 
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Dist. LEXIS 17716, at *8  (E.D. Va. 1986) (“The Commissioner argues further that the Patent 
and Trademark Office is not suited to consider issues of fraud during reexamination.  The Patent 
and Trademark Office does not conduct evidentiary hearings in connection with the proceedings, 
and would not be able to observe the demeanor of witnesses or hear testimony in determining 
whether fraud had occurred.”); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 
 




issued a notice to this effect, stating that “determination of inequitable conduct issues 
requires an evaluation of the intent of the party involved,” and “[t]he Office is not the 
best forum in which to determine whether there was an ‘intent to mislead.’”320
 
  
Commissioner Manbeck also implied that the PTO would follow the courts regarding 
determinations of fraud, explaining: 
We would like to change the rule so we don’t get into intent issues, and 
thereby eliminate what is referred to as the ‘fraud squad.’  A 
Commissioner’s Notice issued by Don Quigg has already done that on a 
[sic] interim basis and we hope to regularize that action in an amended 
Rule.  However, having said this, I should make it clear – the PTO must 
act in accordance with the Court decisions on inequitable conduct and will 
retain its inherent authority to reject for a violation of the duty to disclose 
where that violation is admitted in the record or is proven beyond 
peradventure.  For example, in a patent held unenforceable by a Court for 
a violation of a duty to disclose, the PTO could not allow a reissue which 
attempts to distinguish the patent over the withheld art.321
 
 
 Thus the PTO later clarified that it would not address issues of fraud or 
inequitable conduct, “‘except in the most egregious cases,’ such as when a court has 
made a final ‘decision that inequitable conduct has occurred.’”322  In 1997, the PTO 
simply stated that “the Office no longer investigates fraud and inequitable conduct 
issues.”323  Most recently, the PTO has argued that misconduct should not “simply be 
referred to the [OED] for potential agency disciplinary action” since, inter alia, “the 
agency is constrained in its ability to investigate ‘fraud on the PTO’ because OED cannot 
issue subpoenas during their investigations.”324
 Some have commented approvingly on this long-standing policy, arguing that 
since PTO examiners are primarily technical specialists rather than lawyers, it is desirable 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
533, 545 (N.D. Ca. 1987) (“[A]pparently the only place a challenger could press such a fraud 
claim would be in federal court, not in the PTO itself.”). 
320  1095 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 12, 16 (October 11, 1988). 
321  Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., Entering Our Third Century, 72 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 
1177, 1180 (1990). 
322  David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: the Application by the District Courts of Rule 
9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 895, 901 (2003) (citing Duty of Disclosure, 56 
Fed. Reg. 37,321, 37,323 (Aug. 6, 1991) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.1, 10)). 
323  62 Fed. Reg. 53131, 53165 (Oct. 10, 1997). 
324  Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of 
Neither Party at 16, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, 
-1514, and -1595, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9549 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 




that the PTO leave determinations of fraud and inequitable conduct to the courts.325  
Other scholars have argued on the contrary that, in view of Buckman, the PTO “should 
have the primary responsibility to police against fraud in its administrative processes.”326  
Yet whatever one’s view of the issue, the point is that the PTO presently does not have 
the primary responsibility in policing itself against fraud.327
 At oral argument in Lockwood, Judge Plager found it “a little difficult to 
distinguish [the Buckman preemption] analysis from the PTO problem” merely on the 
grounds that “the PTO doesn’t think it ought to do what the statute compels it to do, 
which is to discipline people.”
  Clearly, then, Buckman is 
inapposite to the PTO context and should not have been mechanically applied to preempt 
Lockwood-type tort claims. 
328
                                                     
325 See Harold C. Wegner, Patent Simplification Sans Patent Fraud, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 211, 218 
(“[W]hile a premium is paid for scientific background, law training [among patent examiners] is 
actively discouraged.  This creates an examiner corps that is well equipped to search and 
technically examine patent applications, but one that is entirely unsuited for consideration of 
complex equity doctrines such as patent fraud.  Skills in application of equity principles and other 
aspects of lawyering are uniquely required for the fair administration of any practice having an 
underpinning in a case law doctrine as complex as patent fraud.  Yet, the Patent Examiner corps 
of the 1990’s is uniquely unsuited to such a complex legal exercise . . . .  Whereas thirty years ago 
virtually 100% of the career Patent Examiners were lawyers, today the number in each examining 
group is more likely to be between 5% and 10%.”). 
  Now it is true that the PTO retains its ability to 
discipline practitioners, and to that extent may be said to “police” itself.  Yet, unlike the 
FDA, the PTO has traditionally looked to the courts to rule on issues of fraud and 
inequitable conduct.  The penalty for inequitable conduct by patent holders 
(unenforceability of the patent) has long coexisted with the PTO’s ability to discipline its 
own practitioners.  How, then, could there be a conflict between a penalty for misconduct 
by third party requesters (here, state tort liability) and the PTO’s ability to discipline the 
attorneys who file such requests?  Moreover, there is scarcely any discernable difference 
between the issues raised by Lockwood-type tort claims and allegations of inequitable 
conduct.  The distinction is utterly formalistic: if inequitable conduct were not formally a 
defense to a federal cause of action (patent infringement), litigants would undoubtedly 
326  Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: the Patent Office’s Troubled 
Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2051, 2079 (2009). 
327  See Janis, supra note 61, at 54-55 n.237 (“Inequitable conduct, another frequently 
invoked defense, also falls outside of the reach of reexamination…However, inequitable conduct 
is not considered in original examination, either.”), citing In re Lanham, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1877 (Comm’r. Pat. 1986) (inequitable conduct will not be considered in reexamination).  
Lanham of course stands for the slightly different proposition that inequitable conduct on the part 
of patent holders is beyond the scope of reexamination, but the general point remains that the 
PTO does not provide a remedy to patent holders subject to fraudulent reexamination 
proceedings. 
328  See Digital Recording of Oral Arguments, supra note 317. 




apply the Buckman framework to preempt courts from deciding issues of misconduct 
before the PTO, saddling the Office with the sole responsibility for policing fraud before 
it—a responsibility it has repeatedly said it does not want.  Indeed, though Judge Prost 
appeared adamant that Lockwood’s claims were preempted, she also seemed aware of the 
awkwardness of grafting Buckman’s preemption analysis onto this context, given the fact 
that courts have traditionally policed fraud on the PTO and Hunter Douglas specifically 
allowed state torts to proceed when based on a patent holder’s fraud on the PTO.  As 
Judge Prost asked counsel for the defendants: 
 
So what do we do with Hunter Douglas, assuming it’s not just dicta or, 
and [sic] our cases that include a sham exception?  Are you trying to limit 
those to the inequitable conduct rubric, and if so, how do you, what’s the 
basis for that distinction?329
 
       
 The Buckman framework does not sit easily with the Federal Circuit’s preemption 
precedents or its longstanding inequitable conduct jurisprudence.  Indeed, in one 
Supreme Court case which revisited Buckman preemption, the petitioners pointed to the 
PTO as an example of a federal agency which does not have exclusive responsibility for 
matters of fraud before it because of the inequitable conduct doctrine.330
 Judge Newman seemed, for her part, particularly reluctant to accept the reasoning 
suggested by Buckman and focused on the fact that state bars routinely exercise 
reciprocal discipline over patent practitioners for misconduct before the PTO,
  Although one 
could form the impression from oral arguments that Judges Plager and Prost were 
viscerally in favor of preemption, the difficulty alluded to by Judge Prost may have been 
one reason why the panel chose not to grapple with the preemption issue in a precedential 




We see when there has been a finding or ruling of inequitable conduct 
through a routine patent action, that that then is followed by a state court 
disciplinary action in the state courts or within the state bar proceedings.  
So that there is no question but that, if the Office goes as far as it can, 
whether or not it finds that there is a basis for some kind of disciplinary 
action within the limits of the actions, the remedies, available to the Patent 
                                                     
329  Id. 
330  See Brief for Respondents at 26-27, Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) 
(No. 06-1498).   
331  See Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding state bar discipline 
of practitioner for misconduct before the PTO was not preempted, stating that “the State 
maintains control over the practice of law within its borders except to the limited extent necessary 
for the accomplishment of federal objectives”); see also, e.g., People v. Bode, 119 P.3d 1098 
(Colo. O.P.D.J. 2005) (imposing reciprocal discipline against attorney found to have made 
misrepresentations before the PTO). 




Office, that that isn’t necessarily the end when there is actual fraud, actual 
sham litigation, even though the Patent Office has no authority to go as far 
as to provide remedies for such actions.  But here we are in the district 
court, so why is the district court precluded from considering those issues? 
. . .  That’s what I don’t understand.  If in fact one could, if this petitioner 
could go back to a state court after this is over, from the Patent Office, and 
here we are in the district court, in the federal system, why is that court 




Why this considerable reluctance to reach a finding of preemption was not found to merit 
elaboration or rebuttal in a written opinion is hard to determine.  Left unanswered by the 
court’s summary affirmance is whether Congress, whose “purpose . . . is the ultimate 
touchstone in every preemption case,”333 could possibly have intended to give patent 
holders a layer of protection against harassment in the form of the SNQ requirement, and 
yet to deprive them of state tort remedies in the event that this protection should fail.  It is 
my view that this notion is as absurd as the finding of preemption which flows from it.  If 
anything, the SNQ requirement is an indication that Congress did not believe the PTO’s 
disciplinary authority to be sufficient to protect patent holders in reexamination, and 
certainly does not suggest that Congress intended that authority to prevent patent holders 
from obtaining relief.334
 Finally, apart from its questionable application of Buckman, the district court’s 
preemption holding in Lockwood also relied on Abbott, a case in which a claim for abuse 
of process based on inequitable conduct during an interference proceeding was found to 
be “an inappropriate collateral intrusion on the regulatory procedures of the PTO”
   
335
                                                     
332  See Digital Recording of Oral Arguments, supra note 317. 
 and 
an impermissible alternative state law remedy.  But whereas PTO procedures (at least at 
the time of Abbott, circa 1991) have provided a remedy for inequitable conduct during an 
interference proceeding (i.e., the patent was awarded to the side with clean hands), there 
is no federal remedy whatsoever to be sought by the patent holder subject to unwarranted 
reexamination proceedings.  In Lockwood, the plaintiff’s tort claims were not an 
alternative remedy but his only recourse.  And “while it is true that the ‘misconduct’ 
underlying [plaintiffs’] claims also constitutes a violation of federal regulations”—since 
Lockwood alleged violations of various federal regulations by the third party requester—
333  Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (citation omitted). 
334  The SNQ requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 303 post-dates, of course, the generalized grant of 
disciplinary authority codified as 35 U.S.C. § 32 in the Patent Act of 1952.  See P.J. Federico, 
Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161, 173 (1993).   
335  Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 




“the suit was brought to vindicate plaintiffs’ rights, not the” PTO’s.336
 The PTO, through its Office of Enrollment and Discipline (hereinafter “OED”) is 
without power to award civil damages; the most it can do is to require a disciplined patent 
attorney to “return unearned practitioner fees or misappropriated client funds,”
 
337 neither 
of which can make whole the patent holder subject to unwarranted reexamination.  State 
law torts can compensate patent holders for harms suffered; the OED can do no more 
than sanction patent practitioners for violations of federal regulations.338
2.  Balancing Lockwood-type Claims with the Rights of Requesters 
  The two 
functions are distinct and without conflict. 
 Much of this paper has been devoted to showing that sham petitioning in the 
reexamination context can undermine the patent incentive and is thus contrary to the 
public policy underlying the patent system.  Yet one might reasonably worry whether 
imposing tort liability for such conduct might not unduly chill the legitimate use of the 
reexamination process.  After all, one objective of the patent system is to ensure, via its 
“stringent requirements for patent protection . . . that ideas in the public domain remain 
there for the free use of the public.”339
 Yet Hunter Douglas has subjected patent holders to tort liability under certain 
circumstances, despite compelling arguments that tort liability could undermine the right 
of patent holders to enforce their property rights and threaten suit.  Placing limits beyond 
which patent holders might wander into tort liability raises, to my mind, a weightier 
question of preemption than that presented in Lockwood.  Imposing limitations on the 
patent holder’s right to notify others of infringement undeniably diminishes a patent’s 
value, and, in weakening the incentive for invention and disclosure, conflicts to some 
  Reexamination is one mechanism by which 
invalid and overbroad patents can be kept from impinging on ideas already in the public 
domain, and any chilling of the process could be construed as an “obstacle” to 
Congressional objectives, meriting preemption of state torts. 
                                                     
336  Cornett v. Johnson & Johnson, 998 A.2d 543, 564 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2010) (applying this 
reasoning to find plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claim had satisfied Buckman’s test for avoiding 
implied preemption). 
337  37 C.F.R. § 11.20(b) (2010). 
338  Although the duty of candor to the PTO extends to all parties filing papers before it 
(including non-lawyer requesters) (see supra note 41), it is not clear that the OED has power to 
impose meaningful sanctions on requesters.  35 U.S.C. § 32 would seem to empower the PTO to 
do no more than “suspend or exclude” such a requester “from further practice” before it. 
339  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 




degree with these twin objectives of the patent system.340
 In Lockwood-type claims, where the case for preemption is much weaker, the 
Federal Circuit could impose additional requirements in the vein of Hunter Douglas to 
protect the rights of good faith requesters.  Further, the court could follow a course 
parallel to that of Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc,
  Despite all this, Hunter 
Douglas did not preempt tort claims against patent holders, but rather imposed additional 
pleading requirements. 
341 erecting a higher standard of proof 
for such tort liability.  In Handgards, the court sought “to prevent frustration of patent 
laws by the long reach of antitrust laws.”342  However, the solution was not to deny 
antitrust liability, but rather “to erect such barriers to antitrust suits as are necessary to 
provide reasonable protection for the honest patentee who brings [a legitimate] 
infringement action.”343  Thus Handgards, finding “that a patentee’s infringement suit is 
presumptively in good faith,” required that “this presumption can be rebutted only by 
clear and convincing evidence” before antitrust liability could be imposed.344  Similarly, 
then, to prevent frustration of the reexamination process by the specter of tort liability, 
the Federal Circuit could erect a higher standard of proof for Lockwood-type claims, 
requiring clear and convincing evidence of bad faith on the part of requesters.345
 However concerned one may be about chilling the legitimate use of the 
reexamination process, it hardly seems fair to devise one rule for patent holders and 
another for requesters.  Filing patent infringement litigation in bad faith has been found to 
“offend[] public policy” and give rise to state tort liability.
 
346
                                                     
340  Id. at 262 (“First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it promotes 
disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the 
invention once the patent expires.”). 
  Courts should now 
recognize that instigating baseless reexamination proceedings in bad faith is equally 
offensive to public policy, and should expose requesters to tort liability.  Preempting 
Lockwood-type torts not only erects a double-standard for requesters, but is itself contrary 
to public policy, as it immunizes requesters from liability for misconduct before the PTO, 
and leaves patent holders vulnerable to unjust attacks without means of redress. 
341  601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979).  In the ensuing paragraph, I rely on the Federal Circuit’s 
approving analysis of Handgards, to be found in Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 
876 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
342  Handgards, 601 F.2d at 996. 
343  Id. 
344  Id. 
345  Obviously this is compatible with the showing of “fraud on the PTO . . . or bad faith in 
the marketplace” required by Hunter Douglas to escape preemption.  
Hunter Douglas Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
346  Mirafi, Inc. v. Murphy, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 




3.  The PTO is Dependent on the Requester’s Candor 
The district court also dismissed Lockwood’s malicious prosecution claim under 
California’s independent investigation rule, which bars suit where the proceeding at issue 
is initiated after an independent investigation of the defendant’s charges by the 
responsible authorities.347  However, given the PTO’s propensity to “parrot” the language 
of the requester, together with the MPEP’s direction that “in a simple case, the examiner 
may adopt the reasons provided by the requester in the discussion of the substantial new 
question of patentability,”348 there is a serious question as to whether the PTO’s 
determination regarding the request can be said to constitute an “investigation” of the 
charges made by the requester.349
For example, the PTO relies on the information presented to it regarding the date 
and public accessibility of purported prior art references.
  More fundamentally, the court’s ruling fails to 
recognize the extent to which any “investigation” of a request—at least during the period 
in which the PTO decides whether to grant or deny it—is dependent on the 
representations of the requester, and thus cannot be deemed “independent” within the 
meaning of that term of art in California precedent. 
350  The references submitted 
may in fact carry a different date than those proffered by the requester, or they may be 
unavailable to the public (e.g., confidential manuals) despite being held out as 
publications.351
                                                     
347  See Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 09-CV-5157, slip op. 
at 9-10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009) (citing Werner v. Hearst Pub’ns Inc., 65 Cal. App. 2d 667 
(1944)). 
  It is evident that the PTO is equally as dependent on reexamination 
requesters’ duty of candor as it is on patent applicants to submit accurate translations of 
348  MPEP, supra note 129, § 2246, at 2200-62. 
349  Cf. MPEP, supra note 129, § 2246, at 2200-63 (“In the decision on the request, the 
examiner will not decide, and no statement should be made as to, whether the claims are rejected 
over the patents and printed publications.”); Ex parte Wikdahl, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1546, 1547 
(PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1989) (“The grant of the request is a procedural matter which 
merely triggers the reexamination proceeding, and is not a substantive determination regarding 
the validity of the patent.”). 
350  See David A. Lowin, Comment: Reexamination “Catch 22,” 14 AIPLA Q.J. 218, 223 
(1986) (noting “examiner’s inability” to make rebuttals to claims that references submitted in 
reexamination are of “printed publication status” and suggesting the “submission of an 
authenticating affidavit or declaration . . . at least for any publication that is not a well-recognized 
periodical”). 
351  See Complaint at 16-17, Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP, No. 
09-CV-5157 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2009). 




the relevant portions of foreign prior art references.352  In the Zilog reexamination 
discussed supra, the PTO adopted the translation of the prior art provided to it by the 
requester, which was only corrected later by the patent holder.353  Moreover, courts have 
recognized the possibility that characterizations of prior art may be so misleading that 
they constitute inequitable conduct, even where the prior art was before the examiner.354  
At times in its history, the PTO has even been so reliant on the requester that, in instances 
when the PTO was unable to locate the patent file history, the PTO would rely on the 
requester’s reconstruction of the file.355
 It is therefore clear that, at the determination stage of reexamination, the PTO 
does not conduct an investigation independent of the requester’s duty of candor, and the 
district court’s dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim in Lockwood was not 
cognizant of these realities. 
 
V.  LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY PROPOSALS 
 A number of reforms would serve to mitigate the weaknesses of the current 
reexamination process and protect patent holders from harm when safeguards fail.  First, 
as part of its overall effort toward patent reform, Congress should create a federal cause 
of action for patent holders subject to unwarranted reexamination proceedings.  
Although, as argued above, the common law tort of malicious prosecution is the best 
remedy in the absence of a federal cause of action, a slight disadvantage is its lack of 
uniformity.  However, the disadvantage is not the impact that tort law might have on 
patent doctrine, which I believe would be minimal, but rather that the remedy might not 
be available to patent holders in all jurisdictions: the tort of malicious prosecution has not 
                                                     
352  See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1377 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that patentee, by submitting a one-page, partial translation of a 29-page 
Japanese reference “deliberately deceived the examiner into thinking that the Canon reference 
was less relevant than it really was, and constructively withheld the reference from the PTO”). 
353  See supra Section III.D.1. 
354  See supra note 103 for cases; see also Lisa Dolak, As If You Didn’t Have Enough to 
Worry About: Current Ethics Issues for Intellectual Property Practitioners, 82 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 235, 242 (2000) (referring to “misrepresentations that are per se material 
because the examiner has no alternative but to rely on them”). 
355  See Tegtmeyer, supra note 103, at 217 (“The Office also wanted to ensure that the 
requests were as complete as possible in the event a patent file could not be located as rapidly as 
necessary to make the determination within the time required by statute.  In such event the 
determination could be made on the basis of the complete request while locating or, if necessary, 
reconstructing the patent file.”). 




been extended to administrative proceedings in all states.356
 Second, some have advocated that the fee for reexamination be raised to provide 
for a “bond” 
  A federal cause of action 
would be free of these disadvantages and commensurate with the need for uniformity in 
the patent system. 
357 that would be used to defray all or some of the patent holder’s attorney’s 
fees358 in the event that the validity of his patent is confirmed.359  This would have the 
effect of discouraging “the abuse that [it] was the objective of the reexamination order 
phrase”360 to prevent, and would provide some compensation to patent holders who may 
not have been subject to a reexamination in which fraud was involved, but were still 
forced to expend significant resources to defend their patent’s validity.  Wegner has 
suggested a tiered approach to the bond, which distinguishes between the less meritorious 
requests for which the entire bond would be awarded to the patent holder, and the “close 
calls” (signaled, perhaps, by the necessity of an appeal to the BPAI), for which only a 
portion of the bond would be applied to the patent holder, the remainder retained by the 
Office.361  This proposal is consonant with concerns raised while early forms of 
reexamination were being proposed and discussed in Congress, when there was such 
apprehension about the costs to be borne by patent holders during the course of such 
proceedings that it was even suggested that patent holders be given access to 
representation by “public defender[s].”362
                                                     
356  However there may be some basis to file these claims in the District of Columbia, where 
the tort has long been extended to administrative proceedings, because reexamination proceedings 
occur there.  Cf. Competitive Techs. v. Fujitsu Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1157-58 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (“[I]t is presumed that the law of the state where the injury occurred controls unless it is 
shown that another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence or the parties.  
Applying this rule, many courts have held that abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims 
are governed by the law of the state where the proceeding complained of occurred . . . .  Here, the 
law of the District of Columbia – where the ITC proceeding occurred – should be applied.”). 
  While I do not call for patent holders to be 
defended at the public’s expense, a bond posted by third party requesters would surely 
357  See Wegner, supra note 147. 
358  See Zandy, supra note 51, at 889 n.135 (“Of course, nothing in reexamination 
necessitates the patent-holder who successfully defends against a claim to bear the costs of the 
defense.  It would be possible to assuage some of this burden by instituting a system of shifting 
costs to decrease the financial drain on patent-holders.”). 
359  Cf. Huron, supra note 32, at 28 (referring to “new provisions requiring proof by the 
claimant of the probable validity of the claim and allowing the court to require a bond from the 
claimant” in an effort to mitigate the abuse of lis pendens in constructive trust claims). 
360  See Wegner, supra note 147, at 286. 
361  Id. 
362  See Janis, supra note 61, at 29. 




lessen number of cases in which inventors “give up” on their patents. 
 Third, in light of the effects of reexamination on a patent holder, a reduction or 
deferral of patent maintenance fees during reexamination proceedings would seem in 
order.  Besides being deprived of the economic benefits of his patent and forced to bear 
the costs of defending it, patent holders are (somewhat perversely) required to pay 
maintenance fees to the PTO.  Such fees are not required for patents which have expired, 
of course; yet a patent undergoing reexamination is closer in character to an expired 
patent (though with the prospect of resuscitation, to be sure) than to a patent presumed 
valid and in force.  Moreover, a temporary deprivation of maintenance fees is a (small) 
incentive for the PTO to carry out the reexamination process with special dispatch.  Any 
consequent loss of revenue should be replaced by raising the fee for processing 
reexamination requests—to say nothing of the consensus views that PTO fees need to be 
raised across the board to support this grossly underfunded agency. 
 Fourth, the identity of the requester should be disclosed, if not to the patent 
holder, then to the PTO.  Current rules governing ex parte reexaminations have no 
requirement that the requester disclose his identity or even that the request be submitted 
by a member of the patent bar—a loophole that would seem to encourage fraud, and 
which would certainly complicate the efforts of a wronged inventor to seek compensation 
from an anonymous requester in court.  Although most requesters seeking reexamination 
do identify themselves on the request, to allow them to escape liability for wrongdoing 
merely by failing to disclose the real party in interest is unacceptable.363
 Fifth, as some have argued,
 
364
                                                     
363 Noting that inter partes reexamination procedures do require the disclosure of the 
requester’s identity, Janis pointed out that while this “may be thought to serve an anti-harassment 
function by forcing the third-party requester into the open . . . the requirement may fall hardest on 
small players, the very group that deployed the harassment rationale most volubly during the 
legislative debate.”  Janis, supra note 161, at 489.  Essentially the objection is that disclosure of 
the requester’s identity would prevent small companies from “testing” the patents of their larger 
competitors through reexamination without fear of reprisal through an infringement lawsuit.  It is 
true that disclosure would “tip off” patent holders about their competitors’ possible infringement, 
but on the other hand, it is very unlikely that the requester would have to fear an infringement 
lawsuit, at least while the patents in question were under reexamination.  And if the patent should 
be held valid at the conclusion of reexamination, then the outcome of the “test” will be clear and 
the requester can purchase a license to the technology. 
 serious consideration should be given to restoring 
the presumption of validity in reexamination.  This would shift the burden in practice 
from the patent holder to the requester, and might serve to discourage the PTO from 
issuing first office actions that essentially parrot the requester’s allegations of invalidity.  
It might also lessen the extent to which a patent’s enforceability is undermined by 
reexamination proceedings.  As Judge Nies argued while dissenting from the majority in 
364  See Conger supra note 53, at 560 (“[T]he statutory presumption of validity must apply 
during reexamination.”); see also Edmund J. Fish, Examining the Federal Circuit’s Position on 
the Presumption of Validity During Patent Reexamination, 32 Wayne L. Rev. 1405, 1433-38 
(1986) (arguing that the presumption of validity must be applied to patents during reexamination 
and that failure to do so violates a patent holder’s right to procedural due process).   




Etter: “The statutory provision in 35 U.S.C. § 282 is absolute: a patent shall be presumed 
valid . . . [and] [n]othing in the reexamination chapter, 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307, states 
otherwise.”365
 Sixth, the SNQ standard should be given a more rigorous construction by the 
Federal Circuit, and PTO procedures that serve as a “diversion of the statutory 
purpose”
 
366 of this threshold requirement should be struck down.  While some thoughtful 
scholars have criticized past efforts by the Federal Circuit to do just this, suggesting that 
“judicial resources are [thereby] misspent fleshing out the delicate nuances of ‘newness’ 
rather than addressing claim validity over the prior art,”367 the problems of fraud and 
harassment in reexamination would seem to demand greater judicial attention to the 
threshold safeguard.368
VI.  CONCLUSION 
  Alternatively, Congress itself could devise more stringent 
statutory guidelines that could be applied to curtail unwarranted proceedings, raising the 
standard from an SNQ to, e.g., a “material reason” for reexamination. 
 Fraud and misconduct may be perpetrated by third party requesters in 
reexamination just as easily as by patent applicants.  In view of the devastating effect 
such misconduct can have on patent holders and, indeed, on the patent system itself, 
further efforts should be made to study the issue, to provide adequate safeguards against 
it, and to fashion satisfactory remedies when those safeguards fail.  This article is offered 
as a first step in that direction. 
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